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I. INTRODUCTION

In this survey, we have discussed those judicial decisions and
legislation produced between July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1998 that we
believed would be of particular interest to Florida real estate practitioners
and others interested in Florida real estate law. Not every case or statutory
change could be included. As in past years, the volume was significant.
Real property law continued to evolve in interesting ways. Our goal was to
inform the reader, but on occasion we have felt called upon to voice
disagreement.
I. ATTORNEYS' FEES

A.

Attorneys' Fees in General

Cuervo v. West Lake Village II Condominium Ass'n.1 A new board of
directors was elected and took control of the Association's books and
accounts. The Association, however, contested the election. It filed a nonbinding arbitration pursuant to section 718.1255 of the FloridaStatutes and
also filed suit for injunctive relief and damages. 2 The Association won the
arbitration, and the court ordered the books and accounts returned. The new
board then filed an answer and affirmative defenses. It also filed a counterclaim. Up until this point, the Association had been represented by the
Siegfried firm. However, the counterclaim against the board stimulated the
involvement of the Association's insurance carrier who brought in its own
lawyers, the Pyska firm, to defend against the counterclaim. The Association won a partial summary judgment and successfully moved for attorneys'
fees.4 The amount of the attorneys' fees was at issue in this appeal.
1.
2.
3.
4.

709 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id at 598; see FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1993).
Cuervo, 709 So. 2d at 599.
Id.
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The essence of the argument was that having different firms handle the
claim and the counterclaim produced a duplication of efforts. Therefore,
they should not have to pay two law firms to do what could have been done
by one. The court agreed, finding that "the gravamen of both the main action
and counterclaim action centered around the issue of the validity of the appellants' election as directors of the association and their actions of taking
control of the association's funds and records." 6 On remand, the trial court
would have to determine the attorneys' fees based on the reasonable efforts
of one law firm, which was to be calculated by reducing the amount awarded
to the
Siegfried firm by the value of the services performed by the Pyska
7
firm.
Jarvis v. Papineau. A real estate broker sued for a commission or, in
the alternative, for unjust enrichment. Following a nonjury trial, the court
found for the plaintiff and awarded $5000 plus interest and attorneys' fees.9
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the attorneys' fees
award.' 0 The court recited the familiar rule that "[a]ttorney's fees cannot be
taxed in any cause unless authorized by contract or statute," but there was
nothing in the record to suggest either basis for awarding fees in this case."
The following cases are organized in reference to that rule. The next section
covers attorneys' fees agreements, and the sections that follow focus on
particular statutes under which attorneys' fees may be awarded.
B.

Attorneys' Fees Recoverable by Agreement

Careers USA, Inc. v. Sanctuary of Boca, Inc. 2 This case involved a
lease. A dispute arose over the meaning of the rent provision. The tenant
filed suit for declaratory judgment and reformation. The trial court found
the lease to be unambiguous and awarded summary judgment to the
landlord.' 3 The landlord then filed a motion for attorney's fees under the
lease provision that stated: "[inany litigation between the parties hereto to
enforce the terms and conditions of this Lease, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover all costs incurred in such action, including attorneys'
fees." 4 Following the lead of the Third and Fifth District Courts of
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 600.
708 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

9.

Id. at 1035.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
705 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 1362-63.
Id. (quoting the lease agreement).
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Appeal, 15 the trial court denied the motion on the theory that the declaratory
judgment action was an action to interpret 16rather than to enforce the terms of
the lease, but the Fourth District reversed.
The Supreme Court of Florida approved in an unanimous opinion
written by Senior Justice Grimes.17 He reasoned that the landlord needed to
defend against the declaratory judgment action in order to enforce the terms
of the lease. 18 Consequently, whether the landlord should recover the costs
should not be decided by the form of action chosen.' 9 The court rejected the
policy argument that litigants should be encouraged to utilize declaratory
judgment proceedings rather than have one party sue claiming the other had
already breached. 2 0 The court went on to acknowledge that the numerous
possible wordings of an attorneys' fees clause makes scrutinizing the
language used critical.2 ' It is, however, disappointing that the court did not
pursue that point; it could have emphasized this was a matter of contract
interpretation and the tools of contract interpretation should have been
brought to bear.
Hollub v. Clancy.22 The buyer successfully sued the seller of a
warehouse for failing to disclose that the warehouse would have to be
connected to the municipal sewer system within ninety days at considerable
expense. The buyer then filed a motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to the
attorneys' fees clause in the contract. This appeal challenged the amount of
attorneys' fees awarded 2 3
The buyer had paid its attorneys a $20,000 nonrefundable fee and
entered into a contingent fee agreement with its attorneys providing, to the
extent the recovery exceeded $50,000, buyer's attorneys would get forty
percent in addition to the original $20,000, but if the recovery were less than
$50,000, the attorneys would have to be satisfied with $20,000. Later, the
agreement was amended to provide that the buyer's attorney would get the
greater of a reasonable attorneys' fee as awarded by the trial court or the
24
contingent
fee indescribed
Theof trial
court awarded
reasonable
attorneys' fees
excess of above.
forty percent
the recovery.
The sellers
argued
15.
Martin L. Robbins, M.D., P.A. v. I.R.E. Real Estate Fund, Ltd., 608 So. 2d 844
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Ocala Warehouse Inv., Ltd. v. Bison Co., 416 So. 2d 1269 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
16.
Careers, 705 So. 2d at 1363.
17.
Id.at 1362, 1364.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Careers,705 So. 2d at 1364.
22.
706 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
23.
Id. at 17.
24.
Id. at 18 (citing the agreement).
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this required them to ay buyer's attorneys more than the buyer had been
obligated to pay them. The district court rejected this argument because it
was indistinguishable from a fee arrangement
upheld by the Supreme Court
2 of Florida in Kaufman v. MacDonald.t
Sellers were, however, successful with their second point on appeal.
They argued that the buyer had hired too many lawyers and could not collect
reasonable attorneys' fees for all their work. 27 The case was factually
simple, but buyers had hired both a sole practitioner and a small law firm.
The seller's expert had testified that a single lawyer would have sufficed
during the pretrial stages, but admitted that an additional lawyer would not
be impermissible for the trial. The court rejected any claim that additional
lawyers were needed due to the fact that the general partners of the buyer
brought the action on its behalf; the record did not reveal any hint of conflict
of interest between the partners, among themselves, or between them and the
partnership.2 The court concluded that there was simply no need for more
than one lawyer at hearings, depositions, or to work on the pleadings.2 9
However, there is something odd about the losing sellers arguing that the
buyer could have won the case against them with less time and effort. After
all, if their case were so weak, why did they go to trial? Nonetheless, the
case was remanded to limit a reasonable attorneys' fee to one lawyer in the
pretrial stages. °
In addition, some of the billing seemed to be based on units of one hour
or more. In twelve instances, the sole practitioner billed for an hour or more
to review a one- or two-page order or pleading. The court found this
unacceptable and it ordered that bills based on unreasonable billing units be
eliminated on remand. 3'
C. Attorneys' Fees Recoverable under Section 57.105 of the Florida
Statutes
Kelly v. Tworoger.32 Two years after the closing, the buyer of a
condominium unit sued the sellers based on the claim that roof leaks were
latent defects that the sellers had failed to disclose. Eventually, the buyer
took a voluntary dismissal, and the sellers moved for attorneys' fees. The
contract provided: "[in connection with any arbitration or litigation arising
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. (citing Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1990)).
Hollub, 706 So. 2d at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
705 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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out of this Contract, the prevailing party ... shall be entitled to recover all
costs incurred including attorney's fees."33 Concluding that the provision
applied, the trial 34court granted the motion, and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.
The court, in an opinion written by Judge Gross, reasoned that the
nature of this action was for breach of the duty to disclose that is implied by
law into the contract based on Johnson v. Davis.35 Consequently, this
litigation did arise out of the contract as contemplated by the attorneys' fees
provision. 36 It was not like an action for fraud in the inducement which
would be based on the inducer's fraudulent conduct rather than the
contract.37
Attorneys' fees could not, however, be assessed under the contractual
provision against a person who had unsuccessfully sought to be joined as a
plaintiff in this action because the dismissal with prejudice of his joinder
petition established that he was not a party to the contract. That did not
mean attorneys' fees could not be recovered. Because this claim was
frivolous, they could be assessed under Florida statute.39 The case was
remanded for specific findings as to the number of hours involved in dealing
with each unsuccessful plaintiff and the reasonable hourly rate for the
attorneys.40
The court also offered some interesting dicta on the fraud in the
inducement situation.4 ' It suggested that it was time to reject the denial of
attorneys' fees where the contract has been rescinded due to fraud in the
inducement based upon Katz v. Van Der Noord. Such a change might be
emotionally satisfying, based upon a vague claim of doing justice, but it
would be illogical and expand contractual liability for fees beyond what
might have been reasonably expected by the parties. This author4 3 hopes that
no court will take that leap. If such a change is appropriate, then the
legislature should decide prospectively that it is time to expand the right to

33.

Id. at 671 (quoting the contract).

34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 672 (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
36.
Id.
37.
Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 672 (distinguishing the fraudulent inducement cases such
as, Location 100, Inc. v. Gould S.E.L. Computer Sys., Inc. 517 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) and Dickson v. Dunn, 399 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
38.
Id. at 673.
39.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
40.
Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 673.
41.
Id.at 672-73.
42.
Id. at 672 (citing Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1989)).
43.
Professor Ronald Benton Brown.
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recover attorneys' fees to a situation where there is no contract and the
defense was not frivolous.
Judge Klein specially concurred. 44 He noted that an appellate court can
only review the trial court's judgment on attorneys' fees by means of
common law certiorari if the case were voluntarily dismissed. 45 The
standard of review under common law certiorari is higher than for matters
that are reviewed on appeal. Judge Klein expressed the opinion that there
did not appear to be a good reason for the different treatment, so he hoped
that the Appellate Rules Committee would consider the incongruity
produced and recommend that the supreme court amend the rules to46 produce
a uniform standard of review regarding the grant of attorneys' fees.
Shahan v. Listle.47 The Johnsons sought to have a city ordinance
invalidated. In such cases, section 163.3215 of the FloridaStatutes required
that the complainants file a verified copy of the complaint with the city no
later than thirty days after the conduct that was the basis of the
complaint. The city had thirty days to respond and, the complainants had
to institute their action in court no later than thirty days after the end of the
city's thirty-day response time. The Johnsons filed a copy of the complaint
with the city, but it was not verified. The city did not respond, so the
Johnsons filed for administrative review by the Department of Community
Affairs, which ruled in the Johnsons' favor.4 9 Then the Johnsons filed a pro
se complaint for a temporary injunction. 50
After receiving a motion for summary judgment and a request for
attorneys' fees, the Johnsons retained a lawyer, John Shahan. Based on the
Johnsons' failure to file the verified complaint with the city as reuired by
the statute, the trial court granted summary judgment against them. It also
awarded attorneys' fees under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes and
divided the payment obliation between the Johnsons and Shahan, their
lawyer. Shahan appealed.
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed.
It reasoned that the
action was not frivolous because the Johnsons' failure to comply with the
statutory condition precedent to filing their action could have been waived

44.

Kelly, 705 So. 2d at 673 (Klein, J., concurring).

45.
46.

Id. at 673.
Id. at 673-74.

47.

703 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1091; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1995).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Shahan, 703 So. 2d at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1995).
Shahan, 703 So. 2d at 1092.
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by the defendants.54 If it had been waived, then the Johnsons might have
won. After all, they did have standing and they had won the administrative
hearing. This seems far-fetched. If the point of the statute is to eliminate
litigation that should not have been brought, it seems counterproductive to
encourage litigation that is based upon the hope that the defendants will be
incompetent enough to waive a valid and obvious defense, but this decision
is consistent with earlier district court cases. 55
Whitehead v. Dreyer.56 This is another case where the court mandated
the imposition of attorneys' fees against asplaintiff and his attorney based
upon section 57.105 of the FloridaStatutes.
D. Attorneys' Fees Under the ConstructionLien Act
58

Hollub Construction Company v. Narula. When a dispute arose
during the building of a home, the owner stopped paying the contractor. The
contractor filed a construction lien, filed a suit to enforce its lien, and made a
The homeowner filed counterclaims in the
demand for arbitration.
arbitration. The arbitration award provided $192,000 for the contractor
against the owner and $150,000 for the owner against the contractor. The
contractor was ordered to pay forty percent of the arbitration costs and the
owner sixty percent. However, the arbitration award did not specifically
proclaim either to be the prevailing party or specify what part of the award
was interest. When the parties went back to court, each claimed attorneys'
fees under the construction lien statute as the prevailing party. 59 The trial
court declared it could not determine who was the prevailing party and
denied attorneys' fees to both.6° The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed. 61 It held that the award of attorneys' fees was mandatory under the
statute, so the court was required to determine who prevailed. The owners
had not filed their counterclaim in the suit to enforce the construction lien;
they had only filed it in the arbitration. Consequently, in the construction
lien suit, the contractor had prevailed on the only significant issue, its claim
Id. at 1091-92.
54.
55.
Id. at 1092. See Solimando v. Aloha Med. Ctr., 594 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); see also Piancone v. Engineering Design, Inc., 534 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
56.
57.
Id. This case is discussed in detail in the section on brokerage agreements and
commissions. See discussion infra Part III.B.
58.
704 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 690; see FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995).
59.
60.
Narula, 704 So. 2d at 690.
61.
Id. at 691.
62.
Id. at 690.
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against the owner.
Under the statute, that made the contractor entitled to
63
attorneys' fees.

E. Attorneys' Fees in Eminent Domain Proceedings
Pierpontv. Lee County.64 The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed three
district court decisions together.65 In each case, the condemning authority
did a quick
take, i.e., opted
jde66 to take possession of the property prior to the
fia
final judgment in the condemnation case. Under the orocedure provided by
statute,6 the authority must have an appraisal done.8 Then the authority
must make a good faith estimate based upon the appraisal.6 9 If the quick take
petition is approved by the court, the authority must deposit the amount of
the good faith estimate into the registry of the court. 70 In each case,
following the deposit, the condemning authority made a written offer that
was significantly greater than the good faith estimate. When it came time to
calculate the attorneys' fees due to the landowners' lawyers, the question
arose how those figures should be used in the calculation.
The statute provided that attorneys' fees were to be calculated based
upon the benefits the attorneys achieved for their clients.72 The statute
defined the benefit as the difference between the first written offer made by
the condemning authority and the final condemnation judgment or settlement
amount. 73 Here, the landowners' attorneys claimed that the betterment
should be calculated using the good faith estimate as the first written offer.74
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected that argument.75 The unanimous
opinion pointed out the difference between an offer and an estimate.7 6 The
63.
Id. at 691; see FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1995).
64.
710 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998).
65.
Id.; Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Lee
County v. A & G Invs., 693 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Lee County v. Barnett
Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See Ronald Benton Brown and
Joseph M. Grohman, PropertyLaw: 1997 Survey of FloridaLaw, 22 NOVA L. REv. 269, 27577 (1997).
66.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 959.
67.
FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
68.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
69.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
70.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 960; see FLA. STAT. § 74.031 (1993).
71.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 959-60.
72.
Id. at 960-61; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).
73.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 960-61.
74.
Id. at 960.
75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 960-61.
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court reasoned that the legislature also knew the difference. 77 Critically,
nothing in the statutes gave the landowner the power to accept the good faith
estimate.
Moreover, there was no constitutional mandate to use the good faith
estimate in calculating attorneys' fees. 7 9 The Florida Constitution requires
the payment of "full compensation" to a person whose private property has
been taken for public use, 80 but the Justices saw no denial of "full
compensation" in these situations. 81 The rule is that the legislature has the
power to enact reasonable attorneys' fees provisions, and there was nothing
inherently unreasonable about calculating attorneys' fees on the first written
offer rather than the good faith estimate. The court pointed out, however,
that this does not allow the condemning authority to minimize or avoid
payment of attorneys' fees by failing to make a timely written offer.83 Such
84
conduct might result in the statute being unconstitutional as applied .
5
Justice Wells wrote a brief concurrence.8 He urged the legislature to
amend the statute to allow calculation of attorneys' fees based on the good
86
It would be bad policy to allow the authority to make a
faith estimate.
faith estimate and then deviate from it in making an offer to settle the
good 87
That position had been argued by Judge Blue in his district court
case.
dissent,88 which also pointed out that there was nothing in the statute to
prevent the landowner from accepting the good faith estimate as an offer.89
Boulis v. Department of Transportation.9 The condemnee claimed
prejudgment interest on the costs expended in preparing for trial. His theory
was that if he did not receive interest, he would be deprived of his property
without due process of law. The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
claim because there was no legal precedent for it. 91 However, noting that the
claim for prejudgment interest seemed supported by logic and fair play, the
Id.
77.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 961.
78.
79.
Id. at 960.
80.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
81.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 960.
Id.
82.
83.
Id.
84.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 961.
85.
Pierpoint,710 So. 2d at 961 (Wells, J., concurring).
Id.
86.
87.
Id.
88.
Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So. 2d 994, 997-98 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Blue, J., dissenting).
89.
Id. at 998.
90.
709 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1998).
91.
Id. at 206-07.
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court certified the question to the supreme court "as being one of great
public importance."9
Department of Transportation, State of Florida v. Robbins and
Robbins, Inc.93 The parties settled the eminent domain action following
mediation. The problem was in the calculation of the attorneys' fees. The
expert testified that the reasonable hourly rate for the landowners' attorneys
should be higher than what they actually billed. Then the expert used those
rates to establish the lodestar figure. The trial judge then doubled the
lodestar, using the risk multiplier to reflect the complexity of the case. 94 The
district court reversed because it considered this procedure as an "improper
'double-decker' award. 9 5 The proper procedure would be to establish a
reasonable hourly rate which did not exceed what the attorneys requested in
their testimony. That should be applied to the hours worked to reach the
lodestar. Then, the benefit obtained by the attorneys for their client could be
used to adjust the fee.
The trial court had made two other errors. It "improperly included the
paralegal hours as part of the attorneys' hours to get a 'blended' effective
hourly rate."96 The attorneys' fees should include hours expended by
paralegals and legal assistants, but those hours should be billed at a
reasonable rate.97 As the court noted, "it is not logical to use a paralegal to
help on a client's case because it is cheaper for the client, then seek to
recoup the paralegal time at an attorney rate from the condemning
authority." 98 Moreover, the trial court should not have awarded attorneys'
fees for time preparing for the attorneys' fees hearing. 99 The condemning
authority is obligated only to pay the condemnee's reasonable attorneys' 1fees
°°
and not attorneys' fees incurred by the attorneys in collecting those fees.
State Departmentof Transportationv. Hall.0 1 In this quick taking, the
department filed a good faith estimate of $20,000 and deposited that amount
in the registry of the court. The landowner objected because the estimate did
not include business damages. The department later presented an offer of
judgment for $126,400 to "settle all claims including business
damages. 10 2 The parties eventually settled for $147,500. However, in
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 207.
700 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 784-85.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 785.
Id.
Robbins, 700 So. 2d at 785.
Id.

100.
101.
102.

Id.
707 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1164 (quoting department's offer).
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calculating attorneys' fees, the question was the betterment achieved by the
landowner's attorney. The trial court calculated attorneys' fees based on the
betterment of $127,500 that the landowner's attorney had achieved, i.e., 1the
03
difference between the good faith estimate and the eventual settlement.
The court refused to base betterment on the difference between the
settlement price and the offer of judgment because it found the offer of
judgment to be defective for failing to provide an itemization, including
specifying what portion was attributable to business damages."145 The
department appealed and the First District Court of Appeal reversed.1
Offers of judgment in eminent domain actions were covered in section
73.032(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.1°6 It did not require the offer of
judgment to itemize the damages. It required that the offer settle all pending
claims summarize relevant conditions, and state the total amount of the
offer.167 This offer of judgment satisfied the statute, and it was not
ambiguous. 108 It contained no defect that would have prevented the court
9
from concluding the case, including calculating the attorneys' fee."'
Consequently, the attorneys' fee should
have been calculated from the
0
betterment achieved above this offer."
State Department of Transportationv. Interstate Hotels Corp."' The
trial court awarded prejudgment interest on an award of attorneys' fees in an
2
eminent domain case, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed."
The only district court precedent was from the second district," 3 so the trial
court was bound to follow it and committed reversible error by not doing
so.11 While not similarly bound to follow another district, the third district
panel •decided
to do so, expressing their entire agreement with the earlier
• 115
opinion.
State Department of Transportation v. Labelle Phoenix
Corporation."6 After the Department of Transportation's offer was refused,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1163.
Id.
Id. at 1164.
Hall, 707 So. 2d at 1164; see FLA.
Hall, 707 So. 2d at 1164.

108.
109.

Id.
Id.

STAT.

§ 73.032(1)(a) (1993).

110. Id.
111. 709 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
112. Id. at 1387.
113. Id. (citing State Dep't of Transp. v. Brouwer's Flowers, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 696 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

Brown / Grohman

1998]

241

the Department utilized the quick take procedure.' 7 Finally, the parties
stipulated to the worth of the property, and a judgment was entered
accordingly.1 8 Then it was time to award attorneys' fees. Because a quick
take appears in Chapter74 of the Florida Statutes, which is entitled
"PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL TO EMINENT DOMAIN," the trial
court utilized section 73.092(2) reasoning that it expressly applied to "other
supplemental proceedings."' 1 9 Under subsection (2), which used the lodestar
method of calculating attorneys' fees, the court awarded $3,672.50 even
though the stipulated price was only $3,800 above what the Department had
originally offered. 20 The Department appealed, arguing that section
73.092(1), which calculated attorneys' fees based upon the benefits achieved
should have been used. 12 The Second District Court of
for the client, 122
Appeal agreed.
The fact that the quick take chapter was entitled a "supplemental
proceeding" was not the controlling factor. 12 Section 73.092(1) was
intended for cases in which a monetary award was the object. 124 In contrast,
section 73.092(2) was intended for use in such cases as defeating an order of
taking or proceedings to determine the parties' respective rights.125
Therefore, it was inappropriate to use the latter subsection method in this
126
a monetary
award.$1,254.127
Accordingly, the attorney's fee
case
which produced
of the benefit,
was reduced
to one-third
F.

Attorneys' Fees in Landlord-TenantLitigation

FloridaDepartmentof Health and RehabilitativeServices v. Morse. 128
The tenant vacated at the end of the lease period. Based on the claim that
the tenant had breached the lease by leaving the premises in an "extensively
damaged condition," the landlord successfully sued for property damage and

117.

Id. at 948.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (1995).
Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948; see FLA. STAT.
Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948; see FLA. STAT.
Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948.
Id.

124.

Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Labelle, 696 So. 2d at 948.
708 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

§ 73.092(2) (1995).
§ 73.092(1) (1995).
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lost rent. 129 The trial court also awarded attorneys' fees to the landlord
30
although the lease did not have any provision for attorneys' fees.'
The landlord had argued that it was entitled to attorneys' fees under
section 82.231 of the FloridaStatutes.13 ' However, the district court pointed
out that this section only authorizes the court to award attorneys' fees in an
action by the landlord for possession where attorneys' fees are authorized by
law. 132 Consequently, the attorneys' fees award in this case was wrong on
two counts. First, the action here was not an action for possession of the
premises. 33 Secondly, even in actions to which it applies, section 83.231 is
not an independent basis for awarding attorneys' fees. 134 It merely
authorizes the award of those fees in that procedural setting when there is an
independent basis for the award.' 35 In this case, there was no contractual
basis for awarding attorneys' fees, and there had been no finding of fact
below that would justify awarding attorneys' fees based on section 57.105(1)
of the FloridaStatutes on the theory that the losing party had failed to raise a
36
"justiciable
Therefore, the attorneys' fees award was
37 issue of law or fact."
reversed.1
III. BROKERS
A.

Discipline and Licensing

Arias v. State Department of Business & ProfessionalRegulation.'38 A
couple was interested in leasing a house shown to them by the licensee. The
licensee called the owner to finalize the deal, but the owner asked her, "[a]re
they Black?" The licensee answered, "[y]es." The owner then refused to
approve the lease, even though the licensee told her that she was not
supposed to discriminate. After talking with her broker, the licensee
explained the situation to the prospective tenants and suggested they hire a
lawyer. A complaint was filed with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), and the owner was ordered to pay a $10,000 civil
fine and $35,000 compensatory damages to each of the prospective
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 641.
Id.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
Morse, 708 So. 2d at 641-42; see FLA. STAT. § 82.231 (1995).
Morse, 708 So. 2d at 642; see FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
Morse, 708 So. 2d at 642.
710 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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renters. 139 The licensee was also found to have violated the law, fined $100,
and ordered to attend fair housing training. 40
Then the Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed an
administrative complaint against the licensee. 141 Based on the same facts,
which the licensee did not dispute, the Florida Real Estate Commission
("FREC") fined her $1,000, suspended her license for two years, and
sentenced her to one year of probation.1 42 She brought this appeal, and the
Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 143
A licensee can be disciplined for violating a duty imposed on her by
law.' 44 However, the board is required by statute to adopt disciplinary
guidelines that "specify a meaningful range of designated penalties based
upon the severity and repetition of specific offenses."
FREC had failed to
adopt guidelines for violation of duties imposed by law. Lack of guidelines
"left the licensee in a predicament ripe for arbitrary and erratic enforcement,
and obviously provided no standards sufficiently "governed
by the legislature
1' 46
as to constitute a judicially reviewable discretion.
[T]he legislature could not have intended section 475.25(l)(b) to
be a carte blanche for the Commission to suspend real estate
professionals [sic] license for the violation of any legal duty
without meaningful notice of likely penalties and without a
mechanism in place to ensure that such
penalties would be
147
consistently applied by the Commission.
The gross discrepancy between the penalty imposed by HUD and the penalty
imposed by FREC illustrated the problem with lack of standards. Of course,
communicating information to the owner about race was improper, but
absent appropriate guidelines, so was FREC's disciplinary order.
Milliken v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation.
Milliken was convicted of criminal possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute. 149 The FREC held an informal hearing, found him guilty of

139.

Id. at 656.

140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 657.

142.
143.

Id.

144.
145.

Arias, 710 So. 2d at 661.
Id. at 657; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(l)(a) (1997).
Arias,710 So. 2d at 658 (citing FLA. STAT. § 455.2273 (1997)).

146.
147.

Id. at 659.
Id.

148.

709 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

149.

Id. at 597.
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violating section 475.25(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes,'50 and suspended his
real estate license.' 5 Milliken raised five points on appeal. 52 Three merit
discussion here.
First, section 475.25(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes provided for
suspension or revocation of the real estate license where the licensee had
been convicted or found guilty of a crime relating to brokerage activities or
involving moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealings.153 Milliken
claimed that the cocaine possession conviction did not fit any of these
categories. The district court found otherwise. 54 "We have no problem
with concluding [cocaine possession with the intent to sell] is a crime
involving moral turpitude."'
Milliken challenged the use of an informal hearing, but the district court
56
found that Milliken had never objected to the informal procedure.
Milliken also challenged the panel's decision because no testimony or
documentation had been presented at the hearing. 157 However, Milliken had
asked for permission to speak to the FREC panel. When asked if there were
anything he wanted
to tell the panel, he had freely admitted being convicted
'58
of the crime.
Consequently,
the panel had an adequate basis for its
159
decision.
Finally, FREC suspended his license until his criminal probation ended,
and he paid FREC's investigative costs.'
Suspensions under section
475.25(1) may not exceed ten years, so a suspension order should not161be
written in a way that the period might possibly exceed that period.
Consequently, the matter was remanded to FREC so that the suspension
162
period would explicitly be prevented from exceeding the ten-year period.

150. He was also found to have violated section 475.25(1)(n) of the Florida Statutes
which states: "confined in any county jail, postadjudication... confined in any state or
federal prison." Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(n) (1997). However, that subsection is not
addressed in this opinion. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 597.
151. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 596.
152. Id. at 596-97.
153. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(f) (1997).
154. Milliken, 709 So. 2d at 596.
155. Id. at 597.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Milliken, 709 So. 2d. at 597-98.
160. Id. at 596.
161.
Id. at 597.
162. Id. at 597-98. On remand, the order was also to be corrected to reflect that it
was to last for his period on parole rather than on probation. Id.
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Nelson v. Department of Business and ProfessionalRegulation.163 A
licensed real estate broker allegedly set off a smoke bomb in a public office
as an act of political protest. Adjudication was withheld when he pled nolo
contendere to charges of battery and criminal mischief, but he was placed on
eighteen months of probation.'6 Then, the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation brought disciplinary proceedings against him. The
department fined him and placed him on probation for ninety days because it
concluded that he had been found guilty of "a crime which directly relates to
or involves moral
turpitude
the activities of a licensed real estate16salesperson
66
5
The broker appealed.1
or fraudulent or dishonest dealings.,
The Fifth District Court of Appeal focused on the question of moral
turpitude because this crime obviously did not involve brokerage activities,
"or a fraudulent or dishonest dealing." 167 Examples it found of moral
turpitude included a physician selling bogus diplomas, bookmaking, and
manslaughter by criminal negligence."' It held that reversal was required
because this crime "d[id] not show a 'baseness or depravity' that [would]
impugn his ability to deal fairly with1 69
the public to the extent that suspension
of his broker's license is warranted."
Judge Sharp concurred specially.17° She agreed that reversal was
required, but challenged the legislature to spell out what categories of crimes
warranted sanctions under this category because the term "moral turpitude"
was essentially meaningless and its application might lead to capricious
results.1
Furthermore, it might be constitutionally infirm, as it is a term
1 72
that fails to provide sufficient warning as to what activities are proscribed.
Walker v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation.' 3 A real estate salesperson needed to complete fourteen hours
of classroom instruction in order to renew her license. To satisfy this
requirement, she took a correspondence course. 174 At the end of the course,
163.

707 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

164.

Id.at 378.

165. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(l)(f) (1993). Note that this subsection allows the
licensee to be disciplined if he has "been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of
nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime." FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(f) (1993).
166. Nelson, 707 So. 2d at 378.
167. Id. at 379.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.at 379 (Sharp, J., concurring specially).
171. Nelson, 707 So. 2d at 380.
172. Id. at 379-80.
173. 705 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
174. How a correspondence course qualified as hours of classroom instruction was
not addressed by the court.
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she did not submit the examination answer sheet for grading, but she
represented on her license renewal application that she had completed the
educational requirement. The FREC sent her application back because it
lacked evidence that she had completed the educational requirement. Then
she sent in the examination answer sheet to be graded. She passed the exam
and submitted the scored sheet, but the irregularities in the application were
noticed, and an investigation was begun. FREC held an informal hearing.
Despite the licensee's uncontradicted testimony that she thought she had sent
in the exam sheet at the end of the course and that her failing to submit the
exam sheet was an explainable oversight caused by distracting events in her
personal life, 175 her license was revoked. 176
On appeal, the licensee challenged the use of an informal hearing.'77
The district court found no irregularity because the licensee had specifically
requested an informal hearing and had never requested that 178
the informal
Thus, she
begun in its place.
hearing be terminated and a formal hearing
7
hearing.1
had waived her right to a formal
The licensee also claimed that the license revocation was too severe a
penalty for the conduct involved, but the district court concluded that this
would not be a valid basis for relief. 180 In reviewing agency action, the court
is expressly prohibited from substituting its own judgment on matters that
are within the agency's discretion. 18' FREC is specifically empowered by
statute to revoke
a license that was obtained by "fraud, misrepresentation, or
82
concealment."'
The case really turned on whether there was sufficient evidence that the
license renewal had been obtained by "fraud, misrepresentation, or
concealment." FREC had the burden of proving intent. The majority, after
reviewing the record, concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial
83
evidence of intent to satisfy the competent substantial evidence standard.1
To emphasize that point, Judge Dauksch wrote a special concurrence.184 The
agency panel saw and heard the witnesses, so it had the job of judging
credibility. 185 It had the prerogative of believing or disbelieving any witness,
175.
died and she
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Walker had stated that the distracting events in her life were that her father had
had changed jobs. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 655 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 654.
Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (1995).
Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654; see FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1) (1995).
Walker, 705 So. 2d at 654.
Id. at 655 (Dauksch, J., concurring specially).
Id.
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187
even
oneshewho
was uncontradicted.1
Judge Sharp
disagreed.
In her
dissent,
asserted
that the clear and convincing
evidence
standard had
not
been met by FREC because the licensee had given an uncontradicted and

s s
credible explanation
I

application.

B.

of her conduct in submitting the inaccurate

BrokerageAgreements and Commissions

The Florida Legislature has now made it possible for a broker to have
two of his salespeople act as sole agents for different parties to a real estate
transaction. 89 The broker can designate the salespersons assigned to each
party. 190 Designated salespersons are allowed only when the property
involved is nonresidential 91 and only where the parties have assets
exceeding one million dollars.192 The parties must sign disclosure statements
indicating that their assets are sufficient and requesting designated
salespersons to act as their agents. 193 The act provides language to be
included in the disclosure form, including the warning that the salesperson is
allowed to tell the broker confidential information; but, the broker cannot
94
reveal it to the other party or use it to the detriment of the confidante.1
This may be acceptable in a commercial setting where the parties are likely
to be sophisticated and represented by legal counsel, but it may well prove
impossible to keep confidences from being violated in most brokerages,
where the emphasis is on completing the transaction. Worse, it may be
impossible to allay public fears that confidences are being violated. The
benefits brokers get from this act may not justify the suspicions generated.
Century 21 Real Estate of South Florida,Inc. v. Braun & May Realty,
Inc. 195 Braun & May was a franchisee of Century 21. The franchise
186. Id.
187. Id. at 655 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
188. Walker, 705 So. 2d at 655.
189. Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act, ch. 98-250, §10, 1998 Fla. Laws 2199,
2199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.2755).

190.

Id.

191. Nonresidential property is property that is not residential as defined in section
475.276 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes as "improved residential property of four units or
fewer.., unimproved residential property intended for [the] use of four units or fewer, or the
sale of agricultural property of 10 acres or fewer." FLA. STAT. § 475.276(l)(a) (1997)

(citations omitted).
192. Brokerage Relationship Disclosure Act, ch. 98-250, §10, 1998 Fla. Laws 2199,
2199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 475.2755).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 706 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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agreement provided that it would last for a specific duration and, if not
renewed, would be "deemed to be operating on a month-to-month basis. '9 6
The original term ended, and it was not renewed. Braun & May continued to
operate as a Century 21 franchisee for some time before it gave notice of its
intent to discontinue the relationship. This dispute arose over 97
what
commissions Century 21 was entitled to under the franchise agreement.'
Paragraph eighteen of the agreement provided that Century 21 was
entitled to commissions on: 1) revenues from transactions in process on the
date of termination; 2) revenues produced by referrals from other Century 21
offices prior to termination; and 3) revenues produced by listings procured
while a Century 21 franchisee.'98 The critical phrase was "termination.' 99
Braun & May argued that the agreement had never been "terminated.,, 2°° It
had simply
•
201 not been renewed, so no commissions were due under paragraph
eighteen.
Convinced by this argument, the trial court granted summary
judgment, but the district court reversed.20 2
Judge Shevin's opinion concluded that a month to month franchise
agreement operates like a month to month tenancy.203 It automatically
renews until terminated by one of the parties. 204 Braun & May's notice that
it intended to discontinue the franchise relationship was such a termination
205
notice.
That termination triggered application of paragraph eighteen
regarding commissions. 20 6
Easton-Babcock & Associates, Inc. v. Fernandez.0 7 The broker had a
listing for a building owned by Fernandez. The broker showed the property
to Noriega in 1992, and the parties reached an agreement in principle that
was memorialized in the confirmation letter of October 28, 1992.20 Then
Fernandez informed the broker that he would be unable to go through with
the sale because a foreclosure was pending. In fact, a foreclosure action had
been brought against the property, but it had already been resolved and
voluntarily dismissed. Believing Fernandez's statement that the threatened
foreclosure prevented the sale, the broker did not insist on its commission
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.at878-79.
Id. (citing paragraph 18 of the franchise agreement).
Id. at 879.
Century 21,706 So. 2d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Century 21, 706 So. 2d at 879.
Id.
706 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 917.
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and let the matter drop until it discovered that the sale had been
consummated eleven months later based on identical terms. Then, the
broker demanded a commission, and, when Fernandez refused, he brought
this suit. 20 9
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the broker. 210 When the trial
judge granted the seller's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
the broker appealed.21 1 The trial judge apparently relied upon the Supreme
212
Court of Florida's opinion in Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling
for the proposition that it was a question of law whether the broker had
abandoned the listing contract.2
This reliance on Easterling was
misplaced. That case dealt with a listing contract that did not have an
expiration date. 214 The supreme court had decided that whether the
reasonable
time implied into such contracts had expired was a question of
21 5
law.
The case at bar, however, turned on the question of whether the seller
had intentionally excluded the broker from the negotiations that produced
the sale.216 Under the listing contract, the broker was entitled to a
commission if it was the procuring cause of the sale. To be the procuring
cause, the broker must have brought the buyer and seller together and
effectuated the sale through continuous negotiations that the broker initiated
27
unless the broker has been intentionally excluded from the negotiations. 1
The evidence in the record was susceptible to a reasonable inference that this
broker had been intentionally excluded, so it was error for the trial judge to
substitute his conclusion for that of the jury.2
Mays v. Hadden.1 The owner of a radio station entered into a listing
agreement with a broker that provided for a commission if: 1) the station
were sold during the term of the agreement; 2) the broker presented an offer
for the asking price which the owner rejected; or 3) a contract of sale were
entered into within twelve months after the listing agreement was
terminated. The listing agreement did not have a specific duration, but
provided it would last at least 180 days. However, after two months the
owner entered into a lease management agreement with a third party and
209.

ld. at 917-18.

210.

Id.at 918.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
526 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1988).
Fernandez,706 So. 2d at 918.
Easterling,526 So. 2d at 686.
Id. at 687-88.
Fernandez,706 So. 2d at 919.
Id.
Id. at 919-20.
709 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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canceled the listing.22° The broker sued. Apparently accepting the argument
that a lease management agreement is generally the first step in the eventual
sale of a radio station, the trial court awarded him the brokerage
commission. 221 On appeal the district court reversed. 222
The court held that there was both competent and substantial evidence
that the contract had been breached by the owner's premature
cancellation, 223 but the contract explicitly provided only three situations in
which the broker would be entitled to a commission and premature
cancellation was not one of them.224 The contract had been drafted by the
225
broker who was experienced in this type of sale.
The court seemed to
have been invoking the rule that a contract should be interpreted against the
drafter who had the opportunity to choose the wording most in his own
favor. 226 Furthermore, the court seemed to have been suggesting that there
was no reason to find an agreement to pay a commission implied in favor of
a broker with this level of expertise. He should have anticipated this
possible outcome and made sure that the agreement expressly provided for a
commission in these circumstances if that is what the parties agreed upon.
The majority concluded that the broker's damages in breach of this contract
were limited to his out of pocket expenses. 2 7
228
Judge Dauksch carried this logic one step further in his dissent.
He
reasoned that the lease management agreement was reasonably foreseeable
and not a breach of the contract because the broker could still have produced
a buyer and earned his commission. 229 Unfortunately, the dissent does not
mention the owner's having canceled the listing agreement. The majority
opinion seems to focus on that as the breach, while the dissent does not
explain why the owner's unilateral cancellation would not be a breach
entitling the broker to damages.
Whitehead v. Dreyer.23 A real estate broker and a ranch owner entered
into a written brokerage contract that provided a commission would be paid
"if the ranch [were] sold to either the State of Florida, The Trust for Public

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Mays, 709 So. 2d at 134.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 134 (Dauksch, J., dissenting).
Mays, 709 So. 2d at 134.
Id.
698 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Lands, the CARL Program or the St. Johns Management District.",232 None
of these bought the land and the agreement was canceled. Eighteen months
later, an officer of the Audubon Society informed the Walt Disney World
Company that the ranch was available for wetlands mitigation purposes.
Disney pursued the lead and bought the ranch. The broker then brought this
action claiming a brokerage contract. z 3 The broker claimed to be the
procuring cause because he had first suggested the strategy of finding a
corporate buyer who could use the land for mitigation. The trial court,
finding the complaint to be without merit, granted summary judgment
against the broker and then assessed attorneys' fees against both the broker
and his attorneys. z 4
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. 235 To be the procuring
cause, the broker "must bring the parties together and effect a sale through
continuous negotiations inaugurated by him. '' 36 There was no allegation in
the complaint that this broker had introduced the parties or inaugurated
negotiations between them. Nor was there any allegation that would qualify
the broker for the exception to that rule, i.e., that the parties had
"intentionally excluded" him from negotiations after he had introduced
them.237 The broker's having suggested what turned out to be a successful
marketing strategy would not be a sufficient basis for claiming a commission
in the absence of an express contract to the contrary.
IV. CONDOMINIUMS
Graves v. Ciega Verge Condominium Ass'n.2 38 Nancy Graves, the
"personal representative" to Fred Graves' estate, appealed the trial court's
non-final order vacating an amended final judgment of foreclosure and
canceling judicial sale against Ciega Verde Condominium Association and
its unit owners in this foreclosure and construction lien action. 39
Decedent Fred Graves, as a general contractor, performed repair work
to the condominium pursuant to a contract. The association later refused to
pay Graves for his services and denied Graves access to the property. 24°
Graves served both a claim of lien and a contractor's affidavit. Subsequently, Graves filed an amended complaint which sought to "foreclose the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1279 (citing brokerage contract).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Whitehead, 698 So. 2d at 1280.
Id.
703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1110.
Id.
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mechanic's lien against the unit owners and... sought recovery of damages
for breach of contract against Ciega Verde. ' 241 Graves sued unit owners as a
defendant class with the association as class representative. The association,
in its individual capacity and as representative of the class, answered the
amended complaint. 42
"[T]he contract portion of the [complaint] was set for binding
arbitration" 243 where Graves was the prevailing party. 244 "Graves served...
Ciega Verde [with] a motion to confirm the arbitration award and to set
cause for trial on the foreclosure action against the unit owners .,245 The trial
final judgment in March 1996 and set judicial sale for May
court 2entered
46
1996.
"[C]ounsel for the unit owners filed a motion to set aside the amended
final judment" claiming the court did not have jurisdiction over the unit
Ultimately, the trial court, at hearing, granted the unit owners'
owners.
motion to dismiss and dismissed the unit owners from the action because
Graves failed to serve such unit owners within the 120 day period starting
of filing the complaint as per Florida Rules of Civil
from the date
248
Procedure.
The appellate court recognized that the trial court erred in vacating the
amended final judgment of foreclosure. 249 The trial court had jurisdiction
over the unit owners because they constituted a class with a common interest
based on membership in the Ciega Verde Condominium Association.250
Ciega Verde's Declaration of Condominium stated that each unit owner
was a member of the condominium association while he owned the unit.2'
When the association authorized work to be performed on the common
grounds, it was understood that the unit owners consented to that
252
As such, Graves' lien attached to each condo unit and
authorization.
could be foreclosed.2 53
Each unit owner was not required to receive individual notice. It was
the condominium's board of directors' fiduciary and statutory obligation to
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 1111.
Graves, 703 So. 2d at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Graves, 703 So. 2d at
Graves, 703 So. 2d at
Graves, 703 So. 2d at
Graves, 703 So. 2d at
Id. at 1112.
Id.

1111.

I 111; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.070(i).
111I; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i).
1112; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
1111-12.
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give unit owners notice of a lawsuit.25 4 Graves' service upon the association,
the class representative, was sufficient and if the court wanted to require
notice to the individual members, it should have provided Graves adequate
time to do so.2ss
Perlow v. Goldberg.2 6 This court affirmed the order dismissing
owner's claims because the facts show that the "directors cannot be held
liable in their individual capacity."2 5 7 Perlow sought personal judgments for
breach of fiduciary duty against Goldberg and Leb, directors of the
condominium association, for failure to properly administer insurance
proceeds.258
Condominium association directors are immune from individual
liability absent fraud, self-dealing, or criminal activity.25 9 The court below
relied on a fourth district case which furthered this rule.26 0 This court agreed
with that holding and stated the directors here were neither unjustly
enriched, nor did they commit fraud or a crime.261 At the most, the directors
were negligent by failing to properly administer insurance proceeds from
Hurricane Andrew. 262 This negligence is not enough to create personal
liability for the condominium directors.263
The court also recognized that owner's reliance on B & J Holding
Group v. Weiss
was unwarranted because the directors in that case
deliberately engaged in self-dealing. 265 That 2656
was not the situation here.2 66
Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass 'n.267 "Kingswood E.
Condominium Association, Inc., brought an arbitration proceeding under
section 718.1255 [of the] FloridaStatutes,2 68 against unit owner Mary Ruffin
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 149.
258. Id.
259. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (1995); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 607, 617
(1995).
260. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc.,
596 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
265. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150 (citing B & J Holding Group v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d
141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
266. Id.
267. 23 Fla. L. Weekly Dl178 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1998), opinion withdrawn
and supersededon reh'g by No. 97-1683, 1998 WL 689766 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1998).
268. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1997).
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and her son, appellant Paul Ruffin.
The reason for the arbitration was
that the association alleged that Mary Ruffin and the appellant were in
violation of the condominium declarations.2 70 "The Association [wanted]
the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominium and Mobile Homes of the
Department of Business Regulation to issue an order requiring appellant as
tenant to vacate the premises and restraining him from further entry."27 1 Mr.
Ruffin "inform[ed] the arbitrator that his mother had moved.., therefore the
matter was moot.,, 27 2 However, the association wanted future protection.
So, the arbitrator issued an order that "Mr. Ruffin should remain away and
off the condominium property. 273
Mr. Ruffin filed a complaint for a "trial de novo" in circuit court and
the Association moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the case
was moot. 2 74 The circuit court entered
275 the summary judgment and reserved
jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees.
The appellate court, "sua sponte," considered the subject matter
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to have heard this action. 276 It looked at section
718.1255(1) of the Florida Statutes277 and found that the arbitrator had no
subject matter jurisdiction, since the arbitrator may only hear disputes within
its statutory authority and disputes that include disagreements involving
eviction or other removal are not within the arbitrator's statutory authority.278 Further, the appellant was not the owner of the unit
and, therefore,
279
section 718.1255 did not cover disputes with the appellant.
Since the arbitrator lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the trial de novo
was not moot. If the appellant had not challenged the matter, the arbitrator's
order would have become final. Therefore, this court reversed the final
judgment and directed 280the trial court to "enter an order vacating the
arbitrator's final order.,
Legislative changes to section 718 include, but are not limited to, the
following:

269. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.
270. Id.
271.
Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *1.
275. Id. at *1-2.
276. Id. at *1.
277. FLA.STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1997).
278. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.
279. Id. at *2; see Carlandia Corp. v. Obemauer, 695 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
280. Ruffin, 1998 WL 689766, at *2.
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Section 718.111(11) of the FloridaStatutes now includes subparagraph
(d) which provides for the association to maintain adequate insurance or
fidelity bonding for all persons who control or disburse funds for the
association.28 1
Section 718.112(d)8 of the Florida Statutes provides that, unless the
bylaws provide otherwise, any vacancy on the Board of Directors of the
association prior to the expiration of a term may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining directors even though they may constitute less than a
quorum or by the sole remaining director. 28 3 Alternatively, however, the
board may hold an election to fill the vacancy.
Section 718.503(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
require that a unit owner who is not a developer shall include a copy of the
financial information required by section 718.111 of the Florida Statutes in
the disclosure information presented to a prospective purchaser.28 4
Likewise, a prospectus or offering circular, per section 718.504 of the
FloridaStatutes, requires the same information to be included. 28 5
V. CONSTRUCTION

City of Miami v. Tarafa Construction,Inc.2 6 The contractor sued based
on construction delays it alleged were attributable to the city. The case was
reversed and remanded due to overly long delay in getting the trial
completed and problems with the final judgment, but the court ruled that two
claims had to be eliminated because they were not for work under the
contract. 28 7 Since the defendant was the city, it was protected by the
doctrine of "sovereign immunity." 288 While the city could be held liable for
breaching the express or implied terms of a contract, it could not be held
liable for expenses incurred before the contract was awarded or outside the
scope of the construction work. 28 9 Thus, two of the claims cannot stand: 1)
the claim for "value engineering damages, ' 29 which was based on the cost
of engineering work in preparing the bid; and 2) the claim for "claim

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

FLA. STAT. § 718.111(11)(d) (1997).
FLA. STAT. § 718.112(d)8 (Supp. 1998).

Id.
Id.§ 718.111.
Id.§ 718.504.
696 So.2d 1275 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App.1997).

287. Id. at 1277.
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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which the court characterized as pre-litigation

costs.

Temple Emanu-El v. Tremarco Industries, Inc.293 The contract
provided that the contractor would provide a new roof and that the price
would include a three J94
year "[g]uarantee against leaks" and a manufacturer's
twelve year warranty.
Based on allegations that the roof was leaking, the
owner filed suit against the roofing contractor, the manufacturer, and others
involved with the roofing job. The manufacturer, relying on an arbitration
clause in its warranty form, moved to require arbitration.
The owner did
not resist. The roofing contractor also moved to require arbitration based
upon the arbitration clause in the manufacturer's warranty. 296 Despite the
owner's objections, the trial court ordered298that claim to arbitration as
well. 29 7 However, the fourth district reversed.
The arbitration code puts the burden on the one claiming arbitration to
prove an agreement to arbitrate. 299 The contract between the roofing
contractor and the owner did not contain an arbitration clause. 300 The claim
for arbitration was based on the argument that the arbitration clause in the
manufacturer's warranty had been incorporated by reference into that
contract. °1 In order for a term to be incorporated by reference, the
incorporation document must contain an expression of the parties' intent to
be bound by the incorporated term. 3 02 A mere reference to another document
is not enough to effectuate an incorporation by reference. 3 03 Here, the fact
that the contract required the roofing contractor to provide a manufacturer's
warranty was simply not enough to incorporate the terms of that warranty
into the roofing contract. 3°

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Tarafa, 696 So. 2d at 1277.
Id.
705 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 983 (citing contract).
Id. at 984.
Id.
Id.
Tremarco, 705 So. 2d at 984.
FLA. STAT. § 682.03 (1997).
Tremarco, 705 So. 2d at 984.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI. COOPERATIVES
Current legislative changes to section 719 include, but are not limited
to, the following:
Section 719.103 of the FloridaStatutes has added additional definitions
including those for "buyers," "common areas," and "conspicuous type. ' 30 5 A
"buyer" is one who purchases a cooperative and the words "purchaser" and
"buyer" may be used interchangeably within the act.30 6 "Common areas"
now include, among other things, cooperative property which is not included
within the units.
'Conspicuous type means type in capital letters no
smaller than the largest type on the page on which it appears. 30 8 Also, there
are additional definitions for "division, "30"limited
common areas," "rental
9
agreement," and "residential cooperative.
Section 719.1035 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to require
that, upon creating a cooperative, the developer or association shall file the
recording information with the division within thirty working days on a form
prescribed by the division. 310
Section 719.104 of the Florida Statutes now has a new subpart (10)
requiring the board to notify the division before taking any action to dissolve
or merge the cooperative association.31
Section 719.502(1)(a) of the FloridaStatutes has added a provision that
a developer shall not close on any contract for sale or contract for a lease of
more than five years until the developer prepares and files with the division,
documents complying with both the requirements of chapter 719 and the
rules promulgated by the division, and until the division notifies the
developer that the filing is proper. 312 Further, the developer shall not close
on any contract for sale or contract for lease period of more than five years
until the developer prepares and delivers all documents to the 1prospective
3
purchaser as required by FloridaStatutes section 719.503(1)(b).
Section 719.503(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes has an added provision
requiring that the developer not close for fifteen days following the
execution of the agreement and delivery of documents to the buyer as
evidenced by a receipt for the documents signed by the buyer, unless the
buyer is informed in a fifteen day voidability period and agrees to close prior
§ 719.103 (Supp. 1998).

305.
306.
307.
308.

FLA. STAT.

309.

Id.

310.
311.

FLA. STAT. § 719.1035 (Supp. 1998).

312.
313.

Id. § 719.502(1)(a).
Id. § 719.503(1)(b).

Id. § 719.103(4).
Id. § 719.103(8).
Id. § 719.103(1 1).

Id. § 719.104(10).
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to the expiration of fifteen days.
The developer must keep in its records a
separate signed agreement as proof of the buyer's agreement to close prior to
the expiration of the voidability period.315
VII. DEEDS

Mora v. Karr.316 The court affirmed the trial court and denied the
temporary injunction to the Moras regarding a violation of deed
restrictions. 31 Karr wished to purchase a home and rebuild it to contain a
three car garage and a twenty-five foot setback. 31 8 However, deed
restrictions only allowed a two car garage and required a thirty-five foot
setback. 319 Karr secured a waiver to those restrictions 320
from the developer
and from adjacent property owners prior to the purchase.
After closing, Mr. Mora, an adjacent property owner and attorney,
wrote Karr a letter that he would sue over the deed restrictions he waived.
Karr continued with construction and Mora sued. 321 The trial court and the
fourth district court both denied injunctive relief to Mora. 32 The most
compelling evidence was the fact that Mora waived the deed restrictions
prior to the construction and that Karr relied on that waiver in making the
purchase. 323
VIII. EASEMENTS

Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. FloridaEast Coast Railway Co.32 4 The trial
court entered "final judgment quieting title to certain property in favor of
Florida East Coast Railway Company." 32 5 The appellate court reversed,
finding that "Citgo was granted an express easement to construct and
maintain a pipeline on the.., property [and that] ... Citgo's failure to

314. Id.
315. FLA. STAT. § 719.503(1)(b) (Supp. 1998).
316. 697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), replacing original opinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D781 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., Mar. 21, 1997).
317. Id. at 888.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321.
Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. 706 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
325. Id. at 384.
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record this easement [did] not render it ineffectual against [Florida
326 East
Coast ("FEC")], since [FEC] was on inquiry notice of its existence.,
The events giving rise to this dispute involved the expansion of the Ft.
Lauderdale Airport and the resulting relocation of various utilities. 327 "Citgo
had a licensing agreement with FEC under which Citgo had the 'right and
privilege' of operating a pipeline under FEC's main track, across FEC's
railroad right-of-way." 28 The right of way and Citgo's pipeline had to be
relocated when the airport was expanded. Citgo "reached an agreement"
with Florida's Department of Transportation ("Department") to "relocate the
pipeline. 3 29 The agreement recognized "that Citgo owne[d] various
property rights along the original pipeline, and provid[ed] for the transfer of
those property rights to the [Department] in exchange for allowing Citgo to
relocate and operate the pipeline on other property" acquired by the
Department.
Citgo informed FEC that the pipeline was to be relocated across the
proposed relocation of FEC's right of way. 331 FEC sent Citgo the
appropriate engineering specifications, as well as an application for a new
licensing agreement. FEC remained adamant that, until it reached an
agreement with Broward County to relocate its right of way, it could not
.332
consider granting Citgo a utility crossing permit.
FEC and Broward County reached an agreement to relocate the railroad
track.333 That agreement provided that FEC would convey to Broward
County its existing right of way in exchange for a replacement right of
way.
The parcels of land comprising the new right of way were conveyed
to FEC which promptly recorded the quitclaim deed. Citgo had no
easements on record relating to this property.33 5
"[T]he new right-of-way property was to be conveyed to FEC 'free and
clear of all encumbrances. '3 36 However, FEC was required "to grant
easements, licenses, and permits to various utility companies... to allow
storm sewers, fuel lines, and other appurtenances to cross the new right-ofway." 337 No mention was made of the relocated Citgo pipeline.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Id. (quoting the agreement).
Id.
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FEC sent Citgo another application for a licensing agreement. As
before, this agreement was never executed. After the railroad tracks and
pipeline were fully completed, it was evident that FEC's railroad track was
built between two of the pipeline's protruding vents. So, FEC brought suit
to quiet title.338
Citgo argued that it had an express easement due to the earlier
agreement with the department. After the proceedings were well underway,
"Citgo recorded a Notice of Easement." 339 After the court "conclude[d] that
FEC was not on inquiry notice of any 'potential unrecorded easement,' ...
that... Citgo was never granted an easement, ' 34 and that Citgo's Notice of
Easement was "null and void," Citgo appealed.34'
Under de novo review, the appellate court was convinced that the 1983
agreement granted Citgo an express easement to operate and maintain the
relocated pipeline.342 "An easement is 'the right in one other than the owner
of the land to use land for some particular purpose or purposes. ,, 343 To
determine whether the "[a]greement grant[ed] Citgo an easement, the
applicable rule is that 'no particular form and language are necessary to
create an easement; rather, any words clearly showing the intention of the
parties to create a servitude on a sufficiently identifiable estate is

sufficient.'"044

There was no provision in the 1983 agreement which affirmatively
established that an easement was not intended. In fact, the court found the
other provisions in the agreement manifested an intent by the department to
grant Citgo an easement.
The court also rejected "FEC's argument that Cit o's failure to record
its easement render[ed] it ineffectual against FEC." 46 In Florida, the
recording act subjects "FEC [to] Citgo's preexisting, unrecorded easement
unless FEC was 'without notice' of it."'34 "If the circumstances known to
FEC when it acquired the subject property were 'such as should reasonably
suggest inquiry' into Citgo's property rights, then FEC is deemed to be on
'inquiry notice' of - and bound by - those encumbrances which would
338. Id. at 385.
339. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Dean v. Mod Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
344. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385 (quoting Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505,
511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(2) (1995).
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have been discovered upon a reasonable inquiry."3 48 The district court
concluded that Citgo's actual, open, and obvious possession by construction
of a conspicuous pipeline placed FEC on inquiry notice of Citgo's
easement.
H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City - Bay County Airport & Industrial
District.350 The issue before the court was whether the Marketable Record
Title Act, 351 operated "to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of an easement
by necessity, when 352
such a claim has not been asserted within 30 years," as
required by the Act.
The appellate court recognized the general rule "that a landowner has a
right to access his land. 3 53 However, it disagreed with H & F, the owner of
a land-locked estate, that its claim deserves different treatment from any
other claim of an interest in land which does not fall within an exception to
the Act and which has not been timely asserted. 5 4
The Marketable Record Title Act was "designed to simplify
conveyances of real property, stabilize titles, and give certainty to land
ownership." 355 A party only can blame himself if he fails to provide proper
notice. 6 The legislature intended to afford a means to preserve old claims
and interests and to give a reasonable time period to take steps to accomplish
357
the purpose.
Since the policies underlying the Marketable Record Title Act "conflict
with the public policy that 'lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy
or cultivation,"' the appellate court certified the following question as one of
great public importance:
DOES THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT, CHAPTER
712, FLORIDA STATUTES, OPERATE TO EXTINGUISH AN
OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM OF A COMMON LAW WAY OF

348.

Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386; see Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla.

1957).
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386.
706 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
FLA. STAT. § 712 (1997).
H &F Land, 706 So. 2d at 327.
Id.; see Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

354.
355.

H &F Land, 706 So. 2d at 328.
Id. (citing City of Miami v. Saint Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439, 444 (Fla.

1981).

1978)).
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
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NECESSITY WHEN 358SUCH CLAIM WAS NOT ASSERTED
WITHIN 30 YEARS?
35 9
Highland Construction, Inc. v. Paquette.
This court affirmed final
judgment360 granting Paquette an implied easement over Highland's
property.
Paquette sued Highland requesting an implied easement be
granted over Vickers 36Street.
Once Vickers Street was abandoned, ownership
1
reverted to Highland.
With regard to determining the existence of an implied easement,
"Florida has adopted the 'beneficial or complete enjoyment rule."' 362 This
rule states that the "grantee receives the right to all streets in the plat
beneficial to him. ' 363 If the grantee can show he will suffer injury differing
in degree and
kind from everyone else, "he is entitled to receive an implied
' 364
easement.
Paquette satisfied the beneficial enjoyment rule. Since he operates two
automobile businesses on the property and Vickers Street was the only
viable entrance to these establishments, the loss of this access would impair
36536
the business.
Therefore, the implied easement was granted.3 66
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franchise Finance Corp. of America.367 This
court reversed a final summary judgment that
368 declared a condition in a
nonexclusive easement unenforceable and void.
Sears owns real property where it operates a retail store, and Bradenton
Mall Associates ("Developer") owns a retail shopping center adjacent to
Sears' parcel. 369 Sears and Developer, having adjacent parcels and parking
lots that were connected, "operated their respective parcels under a joint
Operating Agreement. Southern Homes Park, Inc. (Southern), a corporate
affiliate of the Developer, owned an 'outparcel' adjacent to the (others] but
not... accessible except through the Sears... parking area. '37 In 1987,
Southern sold its "outparcel" to Suncoast Rax, Inc. on the condition that
Southern acquire an ingress and egress easement to the outparcel over a

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id.
697 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Highland, 697 So. 2d at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id.
711 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id.
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portion of the Sears parking lot.3 7 1 Suncoast, at the same time, was
contracting to sell the "outparcel" and easement, if acquired, to the appellee,
Franchise Finance Corporation of America ("F.F.C.A."). However, F.F.C.A.
agreed to lease the property back to Suncoast. Developer and Sears agreed
that Sears would grant the easement to Suncoast and that Developer in return
would sweep both the developer parking area and the Sears entire parking
area. The easement provided:
The rights granted herein shall be perpetual, but shall expire in
the event that:
(iii) Developer,... shall fail to sweep that portion of Grantor's
parcel devoted to customer parking and which includes the
Easement Parcel ("Parking Parcel") as shown in yellow on
Exhibit C hereto. Grantor, its employees, agents or contractors
shall upon written notice to both Developer and Grantee, have the
right, at its cost and expense, to sweep the Parking Parcel. In the
event that after notice Developer and/or Grantee fails to or refuses
to cure, Grantor shall have the right to terminate the easements
granted herein by filing a Notice of Termination of Easement in the
Public Records of Manatee County, Florida, thirty
(30) days, after
372
written notice to both Grantee and Bradenton.
In 1990, Suncoast went out of business and F.F.C.A. terminated the
lease. In November, 1992, "Developer sent F.F.C.A. an invoice for... the
annual cost of 'sweeping' the Sears Parcel parking area." 373 Developer
represented "that if this invoice was not paid, Developer would no longer
'sweep' the Sears Parcel parking area." 3 14 F.F.C.A. declined to pay the
invoice and, fearing that Sears may want to terminate the easement, brought
its declaratory action to have the sweeping condition declared void and
unenforceable.
The trial court declared the forfeiture provision
unenforceable under Florida Statutes section 689.18375 because section
689.18 provides that "reverter or forfeiture provisions ... in the conveyance
of real estate or any interest therein in the state constitute unreasonable
restraint on alienation and are contrary to the public policy of the state." 376
371.
372.
373.
374.

375.
376.

Id.
Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1190 (citing easement).
Id.
Id.at 1191.
FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1987).
Sears, 711 So. 2d at1191; seeFLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1987).
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The appellate court rejected this argument "[b]ecause a grant 377
of
easement is not a conveyance of a proprietary interest in real property."
An easement only grants the right to use property for some particular
purpose, and does not convey title to land or dispossess the owner of the
land subject to easement. Therefore, the district court concluded "that a
specified condition to the continuance of an easement agreed upon by the
parties is not an encumbrance to the marketability of title to real estate"
meant to be protected by section 689.18. 37 9 Easements that end upon the
380
happening of a clearly defined condition have been recognized in the past.
Furthermore, the district court found that the trial court erred in
applying section 689.18 and that even if section 689.18 did apply, the
forfeiture provision would not be void for twenty-one years after the
granting of the easement, since 689.18 (3) and (4) provide that the provisions
do not become void until twenty-one years after the conveyance has
passed. 3
38
Shiner v. Baita.
The appellant, Shiner wanted to end the real
property rights reserved by the ap~ellee, Baita, in a deed given by Baita to
Shiner's predecessor in interest. 3 "Baita, the original grantor of the
property, 8 laced a reservation in the deed to Shiner's predecessor" that
provided:.
Grantors reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns the right to a
hook-up to septic tank located on the land herein conveyed, said
septic tank being located to the Southeast of the acre being retained
by the Grantors herein with the understanding that responsibility of
maintaining said septic tank shall remain with the Grantors, their
heirs and assigns, and for purposes of maintenance the Grantors,
their heirs and assigns, shall have the right to ingress and egress to
maintain said septic tank. It is understood this reservation of use of
the septic tank is to continue indefinitely but that should Grantee,
his successors or assigns determine later that connection to septic
tank interferes with use of property herein conveyed, Grantee, his
successors or assigns shall have the right to pay expenses necessary
to construct a septic tank on the premises which are herein reserved
377.

Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1191.

378.

Id.; see Easton v. Appler, 548 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Dean v.

MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1988).
379. Sears,711 So. 2d at 1191.
380. Id.; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757,759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
381.
Sears,711 So. 2d at 1192.
382. 710 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
383. Id. at 711.
384. Id.
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by the Grantors, and then in that event, this right of hook-up to
septic tank shall cease and be of no further force and effect. 385

Shiner elected to construct a septic tank on the property still held by
Baita because she believed that she had the right to do so after aquiring the
property. Shiner felt that this action would end the reserved right for Baita's
septic tank hookup. Baita, who intended to develop a mobile home park,
disputed Shiner's view. 386
The lower court found that the restrictive covenant was ambiguous and
that Shiner's septic tank would deprive Baita of using her property.
Therefore, the lower court held that Shiner could not take any action
regarding the septic tank that would deprive Baita from using and enjoying
her property. 387
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision. 8 8 First, the
court found that a restrictive covenant did not exist.389 Rather, a reservation
390
existed and that the deed created an easement, not a restrictive covenant.
Although an easement is often permanent, "an easement does not
391 have to be
permanent, [and] may end upon the happening of a condition."
When there is a grant of easement, the intent is determined by a fair
interpretation of the language. 392 When the language is unambiguous, the
court must look at the plain meaning. 393 This court found that there was no
ambiguity in the language of the deed and that it clearly shows that, if the
grantees determine that the septic tank interferes with their use of the
property, they may construct a septic tank on the property, and the hookup
septic tank shall cease.394 Therefore, because "the easement holder cannot
expand the easement beyond what was contemplated at the time it was

385. Id. at 711-12.
386. Id. at 712.
387. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712.
388. Id. at 713.
389. Id. at 712.
390. Id. (citing Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla.
1969)).
391. Id. (citing Datson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
392. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712 (citing Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
393. Id. (citing Richardson v. Deerwood Club, Inc., 589 So. 2d 937, 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
394. Id.
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granted, 395 the appellate court held that the appellant is entitled to enforce
396
the unambiguous provisions and reversed the lower court's order.
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN

A.

Condemnation
Basic Energy

Corp. v.

Department of

397
Corrections.

The

condemnation was initiated by the city which planned to give the land to the
Department of Corrections ("Department") for the construction of a prison.
The city utilized the quick taking procedure, took possession, and gave
possession to the Department. While the Department was constructing the
prison, the landowner appealed and won because the court held the stated
municipal purpose for the taking was invalid. 398 Title reverted to the
landowner, but a prison now stood on the land. The Department began its
own eminent domain procedure to gain title to the prison it had built.399 The
issue on appeal was the appropriate time as of which to figure the
compensation. The landowner asserted it should be when the Department
acquired title under its condemnation procedure. The Department claimed
compensation should be calculated as of the time when the Department took
possession under the city's quick take. 4°
Section 73.041 of the FloridaStatutes provided that when title had been
acquired or perfected after appropriation, the compensation was to be
determined as of the date of appropriation. 4 1 However, the statute did not
define "appropriation" and there was no case law interpreting the term as
used in this situation. The First District Court of Appeal utilized the plain
meaning approach to determine that appropriation was not intended to be
synonymous with the time of acquiring title.402 Review of the statutory
history supported the trial court's conclusion that "appropriation" meant the
time when the condemning authority took possession. Moreover, the court
noted that this situation was similar to an inverse condemnation situation
when calculating damages. 4° Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit
395. Id. (citing Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Fields v. Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410,414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
396. Id. at 713.
397. 709 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
398. Id. at 125.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401.
FLA. STAT. § 73.031 (1993).
402. Basic Energy, 709 So. 2d at 126.
403. Id. at 127.
404. Id. at 128.
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court's decision to calculate compensation as of the time when the
Department first took possession.
City National Bank. v. Dade County. ° The landowner appealed a jury
verdict denying it severance damages on the condemnation of a comer of its
land for a road widening project.
The problem was that the land had not
yet been developed and was, at the time of the condemnation, being used as
an overflow parking lot for a nearby stadium. Years earlier, the landowner
had a conceptual site plan prepared showing a retail strip shopping center
with out-parcels. The county had rezoned the land from residential use to
commercial use, consistent with the site plan.408 However, the landowner
never proceeded past that point. The landowner had never sought approval
for the site plan and had not taken any further steps to implement the plan.
At trial, the landowner sought to introduce the site plan into evidence to
prove that the condemnation interfered with the plan by reducing the number
of out-parcels from four to three or reduce the size of the out-parcels to
smaller than normal size, reducing the business value of the mall. 40 9 The
trial court excluded the conceptual site plan and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed.41 °
The rule is that the amount of damages awarded to a property owner in
an eminent domain case is determined by the uses to which the property is
then being put or to those which it could reasonably be put.411 "'It is not
properto speculate on what could be done to the land or what might be done
to it to make it more valuable and then solicit evidence on what it might be
worth with such speculative improvements at some unannounced future
date.' ' 412 The trial court correctly applied the rule.413 The landowner could
not have reasonably relied upon the approval of this site plan.4 14 Whether
this conceptual site plan would ever be approved or implemented was merely
speculation. 41 5 It would not have been proper to base the award on such
speculation. 1 6
Moreover, the fact that the appraiser's report mentioned the conceptual
site plan did not open the door to the plan's introduction into evidence. He
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at 126-28.
715 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352.
City Nat'l Bank, 715 So. 2d at 352.
Id. (quoting Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d 219, 220-21 (Fla. 1955)).

413.

Id.

414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
City Nat'l Bank, 715 So. 2d at 353.
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did not base his appraisal on the conceptual site plan.417 He merely reported
the facts that he had a meeting with the landowner and had analyzed the
landowner's concerns which included how the condemnation
would affect
418
the plans which the landowner had for the future.
Department of Transportation v. Rogers.419 The Department condemned the entire property. At the time of the condemnation, the property
was leased to the operator of a restaurant. 42° The jury fixed compensation at
$705,000. One of the landowner's appraisers, a self-styled "business
appraiser," based his opinion on a residual methodology. 421 This focused on
the sales at the restaurant, and projections of future income, which were
significantly above average for the region. The appraiser attributed that to
422
The department appealed based on the admission of this
the location.
testimony and on the theory that the evidence did not support the award.
423
The district court agreed with the department on both points and reversed.
Business damages are not part of the full compensation mandated by the
4 24 Business damages are provided by statute in
Florida Constitution.
the
case of a partial taking.425 Such statutes granting legislative largess are
strictly construed in favor of the state. Since the entire progerty was taken
here, the landowner was not entitled to business damages.
The district
court concluded that the appraisal testimony based on projected sales was, in
effect, a calculation of business damages.
In substance, it was testimony
about the value of the business and reflected the degree to which location
affected the business's value. The testimony was not
about the value of the
428
admitted.
been
have
not
should
it
so
itself,
property
As to the final award, the court noted that five appraisers testified at
trial.429 The Department's appraisers valued the property at approximately
$314,000. The landowner's appraisers valued the lot at $450,000 and a new
building, to replace the thirty year old building taken, at $181,000. That
total of $631,000 is far below the $705,000 the jury awarded. 436 "None of
417.

Id.

418.

Id.

419.
420.

705 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 586.

421.

Id.

422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id. at 587.
Id. at 586.
Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 587.
FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 587-88.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588-89.
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these figures [alone or] in any combination support[ed] the amount awarded." 43 '
Pol v. Pol.432 As part of the property division in a divorce, the husband
agreed to buy the wife's interest in a hotel they owned, but the agreement
provided that the wife would receive fifty percent of the profits if the
husband sold or transferred ownership within five years. 433 When the hotel
was taken in a condemnation action, the wife sought a share of the
condemnation proceeds. The trial court held that the husband was not a
willing seller and, therefore, reasoned that no sale or transfer had occurred to
trigger her right to participate in the profits.434 The Third District Court of
Appeal disagreed and reversed.435
Neither "sale" nor "transfer" was necessarily limited to a voluntary
transaction. That either could be involuntary was evidenced by the familiar
term, "forced sale." 436 The rule is that "a court cannot rewrite the clear and
unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract. 437 Under the unambiguous
terms of
this contract the wife was entitled to share in this condemnation
43 8
award.

Taylor v. Departmentof Transportation.439 The landowner's tract was
bisected by a river. Part of his land was taken, so he sought severance
damages. He proffered testimony by experts that his remaining land would
be devalued by the roadway and bridge that the Department of Transportation was planning to build upstream because the design was flawed. 44 0 The
general rule is that severance damages are allowed to attach to the remaining
property due to use of or activity on the part of the land that has been
taken. 4"n However, his land was to be used only as a mitigation area. The
roadway and bridge were to be built upstream on land that had been taken
from others. Invoking the rule, the Department objected to the proffered
testimony and the circuit court granted the department's motion in 443
limine to
deny severance damages. 442 The second district, however, reversed.

431. Rogers, 705 So. 2d at 589.
432. 705 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
433. Id. at 52.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 53.
436. Id.
437. Pol, 705 So. 2d at 53.
438. Id.
439. 701 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
440. Id. at 611.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 612.
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The general rule is subject to an exception "where the use of the land
taken constitutes an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which the
land taken and other adjoining land is put." 444 In this case, the land was
being taken as part of one road and bridge project. Even though the roadway
and bridge were not to be located on the land taken from him, the alleged
negative effect of the project, according to the proffered testimony, would
decrease the value of the parcels the landowner still owned. 445
Conseuently,
it was
147 the motion in
M16
• error to exclude that testimony and grant
limine.
A new trial was ordered and the case remanded.
448
Night Flight, Inc. v. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth.
Night Flight operated a club on leased premises. Under the terms of the
lease, Night Flight had the right to use an adjacent parking lot during certain
hours every day. The Authority took the entire building in which the club
was located. 44 9 Business damages are recoverable by statute in cases where
there has been a partial taking.45 Night Flight claimed this was a partial
taking because it conducted activities like a theme party, a fund raising car
wash, an Easter egg hunt, Fourth of July celebrations, a volleyball game, and
a birthday party in the adjacent parking lot.45 1 The trial judge granted
summary judgment against Night Flight, but the district court reversed. 452
Under the statute,4 53 recoverable business damages are limited to
reasonable damages to an established business located on the unappropriated
land.454 Night Flight would have to establish that the activities in the parking
lot were authorized by the lease. The most that Night Flight could recover
would be lost profits from the activities in the parking lot. Moreover, it
would have to prove that its activities in the parking lot were an established
and continuing business for a period of at least five years before the taking.
However, the record did not preclude recovery in front of a jury, so summary
judgment was inappropriate.

444.
Tampa, 417
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Taylor, 701 So. 2d at 611 (quoting Lee County v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of
So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
Id.
Id.at 612.
Id.
702 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539. See FLA. STAT. § 73.017(3)(b) (1991).
Night Flight, 702 So. 2d at 539.
Id. at 540.
FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
Id.
Night Flight, 702 So. 2d at 540.
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B.

Inverse Condemnation

45 6
When the
Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater.
city built a new park, it lacked a properly functioning storm water
management system. Until the problem was corrected, flooding occurred in
a residential subdivision. The developer brought this suit for inverse
condemnation based on a temporary taking.457 The trial court granted
summary judgment on the theory that Florida does not provide compensation
for temporary takings.45 8 However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
disagreed and vacated the order below.45 9 The court concluded that since the
United States Supreme Court decided FirstEvangelicalLutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,460 a cause of action for a temporary
regulatory taking has been recognized under the United States
Constitution. 461 Following suit, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
improper seizure of a truck for a period of two years was compensable as a
Consequently, "[i]f
temporary taking under the Florida Constitution.
substantial periodic flooding occurred and was expected to recur and such
flooding denied Associates any reasonable use of its property because
its project, a cause of action for inverse
Edgewater defectively constructed
463

condemnation does lie."'

Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles.464 In 1941, the state signed an oil
exploration contract and option to lease. Coastal Petroleum succeeded to the
rights of the optionee/lessee in 1947. A dispute arose concerning those
rights and the parties reached a settlement in 1976. One part of the
settlement was that Coastal would retain a residual royalty for all gas and oil
produced from a certain area until the year 2016. However, in 1990, the
Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal
Development Trust Fund, adopted a policy prohibiting drilling and oil and
gas production in the sovereign waters of the state. Likewise, the Florida
Legislature passed a statute prohibiting oil and gas leases on Florida's west
coast north of latitude twenty-six degrees. Coastal's residual royalty area

456.
457.
458.
1983).
459.
460.
461.
462.
1990).
463.
464.

706 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 50.
Hillsborough County v. Gutierrex, 433 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
Edgewater, 706 So. 2d at 52.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
Edgewater,706 So. 2d at 52.
In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, 576 So. 2d 261 (Fla.
Edgewater, 706 So. 2d at 52 (citations omitted).
701 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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465

land was in the area covered by the statute.
Since that had the effect of
guaranteeing that there would be no oil and gas production from which
Coastal could receive royalties, Coastal sued on the theory of inverse
condemnation.4 66
After trial without a jury, the circuit court denied recovery and the first
district affirmed. 467 Not every interest obtained from the state rises to the
level of a protectable property interest under eminent domain law. 468 The
petitioner here had a right to share in the royalties produced under
nonexistent oil and gas leases. Nothing in the settlement agreement
explicitly obligated the state to enter into such leases. Any implied covenant
of fair dealing which might have been found in a similar agreement between
private parties would have to be balanced by the state's obligations under the
public trust doctrine to act only in the public interest and the state's
obligation to exercise police powers for the public good. 469 The state's
conduct here was to protect the public interest rather than to defeat Coastal's
rights to royalties. Nor was there any evidence that the land involved had
any potential to produce any oil and gas before the agreement would
expire. 47 Under the circumstances, Coastal's rights were simply too47 1speculative to require compensation under inverse condemnation doctrine.
Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County.472 When plaintiff
bought the land, the county was in the process of actively considering a new
comprehensive land use plan. Under the old plan, use was limited to one
dwelling per 2.5 acres or one dwelling per two acres in a planned unit
development. Under the proposed plan, the area was to be down-zoned to
one dwelling per twenty acres. Plaintiff formally applied for certification as
a Planned Unit Development ("PUD") under the old plan, but the county
commission had directed its staff not to certify any applications for
certification that did not comply with the plan then under consideration.473
Plaintiff sued over this denial and eventually won in the district court
because the old plan, not yet having been replaced by the enactment of the
new one, was still in effect.474
465. Id. at 622-23.
466. Id. at 623.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 625.
469.
CoastalPetroleum, 701 So. 2d at 624.
470. Id. at 625.
471. Id.
472. 712 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
473. Id. at 400.
474. Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 590 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (referred to as "Gardens I" by the court to distinguish it from this appeal
which the court labled "Gardens II").
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Before the case could be heard on remand, the plaintiff succeeded in
having the land annexed by the City of Palm Beach Gardens. The city
approved the plaintiff's development plan which the county had refused to
consider. Plaintiff then filed a supplemental complaint against the county
seeking damages for a temporary taking and violation of the plaintiff's civil
rights. 5
The district court found that the takings claim was ripe for review even
though plaintiff had never attempted to get its plan approved under the new
comprehensive plan.476 The ripeness doctrine has a futility exception and the
court concluded this case fit squarely within it.477 Any attempt to get
approval of one residential unit per two acres under a plan calling for one
residential unit per twenty acres would have been futile.47 However, there
was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that
under the new plan the land still had a significant value at $3000 per
acre. 479 While this was less than the $8000 per acre that it would have had
under the old plan, the plaintiff had not established that it constituted a
taking in light of a reasonable investment backed expectation. 480
The district court also rejected the civil rights claim under Title 42
section 1983 of the United States Code.481 Such a claim must satisfy a twoprong test: 1) there must be a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest; and 2) the deprivation must be the result of arbitrary and
unreasonable government action.4 82 The right to have its application for
certification of its PUD which complied with the existing comprehensive
plan was a property right subject to due process protection. However, the
county's act was not arbitrary and unreasonable under the circumstances.4 83
The county was actively considering the new comprehensive plan and it was
not unreasonable to avoid approving plans that would be inconsistent with
4
the new plan, even though that proved to be prohibited by the law.4
8
IntracoastalNorth Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Palm Beach County.4 85
The condominium association owned land fronting the Intracoastal
Waterway. 486 At this location, the association operated and owned wooden
475.
476.

Gardens,712 So. 2d at 400-01.
Id. at 401.

477.
478.
479.

Id.
Id.
Id.

480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

Gardens,712 So. 2d at 402.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 403 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997)).
Gardens,712 So. 2d at 403.
Id. at 403-04.
698 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Intracoastal,698 So. 2d at 384.
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docks that were used by recreational boaters.487 Directly to the north was a
When the new bridge was built, the channel was
bridge over the river.
widened to make navigation safer on the intracoastal. 489 However, the channel widening increased the tidal currents along the associations's frontage
except during the periods when the tide changed. 490 These slack periods
occurred four times a day and lasted for one-half hour.491 Only during the
slack periods could a recreational boater safely dock or moor at the
association's wooden docks. The association claimed that this diminution in
its ability to use its docks was a taking for which compensation must be paid.
The trial court, however, disagreed and the district court affirmed. 492
It
The district court found itself faced with a case of first impression.
concluded that an increase in the speed at which water flowed past riparian
land did not constitute a physical invasion or an appropriation of property
to use
the water are inherently
rights because a riparian landowner's
•
• rights
•494
,
.
servient to the public's right to navigation and commerce on the water.
The court noted that this was not a case in which the landowner could claim
that the governmental action had rendered the land useless, nor was it a case
in which the riparian landowner's access to the water was denied or even
substantially diminished. 95 Consequently, the inverse condemnation action
failed.496
Lee County v. Kiesel.497 The landowner bought land on the riverbank
and built an expensive home. Later, the county built a bridge that extended
at an angle from the adjacent lot across the river so as to obstruct the
landowner's view. The bridge was not on any of the landowner's property,
and none of the landowner's property was condemned for the bridge
construction, but the landowner presented expert testimony that the location
of the bridge caused a substantial drop in the value of the property. The trial
court granted final judgment to the landowner on the issue of inverse
condemnation and the county appealed. 498
The district court rejected the county's claim that the appropriate test
was the one used for regulatory takings, i.e., whether "the bridge
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Intracoastal,698 So. 2d at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id.
Intracoastal,698 So. 2d at 386.
705 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1014.
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construction substantially ousted them from or deprived them of
substantially all beneficial use of their property. 499 This was not a
regulatory takings case. The owner
of shore land along navigable water has
"common law riparian rights." 5 Florida has long recognized that one of
those riparian rights "is the right to an unobstructed view over the water to
the channel." 501 Because navigable waters have irregular paths, no geometric formula governs precisely when activity interferes with that right. The
question, to be decided on a case by case basis, is whether the activity, in
this case the building of the bridge, "substantially and materially obstruct[s]
the land owner's view to the channel. 50 2 The evidence included testimony
by one expert witness that "eightger cent [sic] of [the] view to the channel
That satisfied the test. Consequently,
was obstructed by [this] bridge."
the district court affirmed the holding that a taking had occurred. 5 0
VLX Properties,Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, Inc.50 5 Of particular
interest in this case was the fact that the mortgagee had made an inverse
condemnation claim against the utility that allegedly misused an easement
and misused a commonly owned pond. The circuit court held the mortgagee
did not have standing, and the mortgagee appealed.5 6 The district court
affirmed because in Florida a mortgagee has only a lien on the property and,
therefore, is not the landowner.
Under the Florida Constitution,
private property is taken for
compensation
is
due
to
only
the
owner
when
5 °8
public use.
This analysis understates the matter. Under the circumstances, this
mortgagee was not deprived of any property rights. However, it is
conceivable that a mortgagee might be deprived of its security by
governmental action so as to have standing to bring an inverse condemnation
suit, even though that did not occur in this case.
X. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Jacksonville v. American Environmental Services, Inc.50 9 The court
addressed the lower court "judge's declaratory statement concerning the
499.

Id. at 1015.

500.
501.
502.
503.

Id.
Id.
Kiesel, 705 So. 2d at 1016.
Id.

504.

Id.

505.
506.

701 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 393.

507.
508.

Id. at 395.
Id. (citing FLA CONsT. art. X, § 6).

509.

699 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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applicability and validity of the local certificate of need application
ordinances." 5'0 This court affirmed the lower court and held American
Environmental Services "could not properly be51required to obtain a local
certificate of need from the City of Jacksonville." '
"Jacksonville's CON [Certificate of Need] ordinances, as applied to
[American Environmental Services Inc.'s] proposed hazardous waste
transfer station... conflict[ed] with chapter 403 of the Florida
Statutes. ' 2 "The Jacksonville ordinances require a determination of local
need, and impose
513 a condition that the waste only be of a type generated in
Duval County."
In comparison, chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes documents "a
statewide need for hazardous waste facilities ... and contemplate[s]
regional... facilities for the transfer, storage and treatment of hazardous
waste." 514 The City of Jacksonville cannot prevent the facility by
determining lack of local need, even though statutes refer to local
assessments of hazardous waste management. Local assessments have515the
purpose of compiling information for an assessment of need in the state.
Local governments cannot enact an ordinance pertaining to the subject
of hazardous waste regulation that is more stringent than chapter 403
rules.5 16 As per chapter 403, local governments can control the zoning of
such hazardous waste and "impose necessary conditions to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens ... but
51 7 may not impose an
additional obligation to satisfy a test for local need."
Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n v. Department of Environmental
Protection. 8 "[F]inal order of the... Department of Environmental
Protection... den[ied] the Association the right to apply for. a permit to
construct a dock on sovereignty land." 519 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
concluded that the association had a "sufficient title interest" in the uplands
for the purpose of seeking permission to construct a dock and thus, the court
reversed the final order.
510. Id. at 256.
511.
Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(8) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 403.7225(7) (1995); FLA. STAT. §. 403.723 (1995).
515. American Envd., 699 So. 2d at 256; see also FLA. STAT. §. 403.7225 (1995).
516. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 256; see also FLA. STAT. §. 403.7225(10) (1995).
517. American Envtl., 699 So. 2d at 257 (citing Escambia County v. Trans Pac., 584
So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
518. 704 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
519. Id. at 703.
520. Id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (1996)).
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This was the third appeal involving the Association and the
521
The
This discussion pertains solely to the last appeal.
Parlatos.
association through Environmental Services, Inc. filed an application with
the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for the pernmits needed
to construct the dock.522 This was the issue of the prior appeal. The
application sought a dredge fill permit and permission from the State, as
owner of the submerged lands, to construct such dock. Almost a year later,
the DEP denied the application and stated that the holder of an easement
does not have sufficient title interest to make an application for activities
pertaining to submerged lands. 523
In return, Secret Oaks requested a formal hearing. "[T]he hearing
officer concluded that there were no material issues of fact and ordered the
case back to the agency for an informal hearing."5 24 At the informal hearing,
the Director stated the issue as "whether the Association, as the holder of an
easement, is among the class of persons who may file an application to
conduct activities on state-owned sovereign submerged lands." 5
The
Director issued a lengthy order regarding such issue. The DEP framed the
issue as follows:
[W]hether the Association, as the holder of recorded contractual
rights to construct, maintain and use all docks on lot 10, and,
concomitantly, to limit the rights of any owner or lessee of lot 10,
is precluded from applying for a permit to construct a dock because
the rule requirement of "sufficient title interest in uplands for the
intended purpose" means the appellant must have a possessory
interest in the upland property.
In this case, the Owners' Agreement and the recorded easement on lot
ten provided that lot owners in the Secret Oaks Subdivision were granted
pedestrian access to the St. John's River and to any dock that is situated or
may later be situated thereon. 527 The association was obligated to improve,
repair, or maintain the easement.528
The DEP relies on the definition of "title interest" as set forth "in
Black's Law Dictionary: Title is defined as, 'the means whereby the owner
of lands has the just possession of his property. The union of all the
521.
522.
523.

Id.
Id. at 704.
Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 704.

524.

Id. at 705.

525.
526.
527.

Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.

528.

Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 706.
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elements which constitute ownership. Full independent and fee ownership.
The right to or ownership in land."'9 Just because title can be the means to
receive right of possession, that does not dictate that all possessory interests
are title interests.5 30 This case clearly shows "that the Association has
recorded contractual rights in lot 10 sufficient to grant it the right to build
the dock. ' 5 31 If the language "sufficient title interest in the
32 uplands" meant
only "right of possession," the agency would have said so.:
In addition, the DEP "offers no reason why a possessory interest is the
only possible 'title interest' ... [or] why a 'possessory' interest would be the
minimum 'sufficient title interest' for dock-building permit application
purposes.533 This court viewed the "[A]gency's interpretation [as] illogical
and unreasonable. 534 To interpret "title interest" as meaning "right of
possession" creates irrational distinctions. 35
XI. HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Legislative changes to chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
Section 617.303 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (8).536
This provides that "[a]ll association funds held by a developer shall be
maintained separately in the association's name.
There shall be no
comingling of reserve and operating funds prior to turnover. 538 However,
"the association may jointly invest reserve funds; [even though the] invested
funds must be accounted for separately.5539
Section 617.307 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (3).540
This subsection is designed to provide for transition of homeowners'
association control in a community.5 4 1 Under this subsection, such shall
occur when "[m]embers other than the developer are entitled to elect at least
529. Id. at 707 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (5th ed. 1979)).
530. Id.
531.
Id.
532. Id.
533. Secret Oaks, 704 So. 2d at 707.
534. Id. at 708.
535. Id. at 707.
536. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §1, 1998 Fla. Laws 2277, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.303(8)).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3)).
541. Id.
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a majority of the board of directors of the homeowners' association." 542
"The developer shall, at the developer's expense, within no more than 90
days deliver the [prescribed] documents to the board." 543
Section 617.3075 of the Florida Statutes has been enacted to create a
list of prohibitive clauses to be found in homeowners' association
documents. 544 Subsection (1) and its subparts prohibit provisions to the
effect that the developer has the unilateral ability and right to make changes
in the homeowners' association documents after the transition of the
homeowners' association control in a community to the nondeveloper
members; that the association is restricted from filing a lawsuit against the
developer; and that the developer is entitled to cast votes in amount that
545
exceeds one vote per residential lot after the transition to the association.
Subparagraph (2) declares the prohibited position stated above as
unenforceable as a matter of public policy where those clauses were created
on or after the effective date of that section, October 1, 1998.546
XII. INSURANCE

Fassi v. American Fire & Casualty Co.547 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal
da affirmed
548
• the final judgment denying Fassi's claim for fire
damages.
Fassi's home was destroyed by fire and he filed a claim for
damages under his homeowners' policy. 549 American Fire and Casualty was
suspicious as to the cause of the fire and wanted Fassi to submit to
examination under oath and provide a sworn claim of loss. The examination
was never conducted since Fassi failed to contact the attorneys involved. In
addition, Fassi still failed to respond after American Fire and Casualty
followed up with a letter. The law firm scheduled the examination on behalf
of American. In return, Fassi refused to submit
to the sworn examination
550
because of the threat of criminal proceedings.
A claimant cannot recover fire losses under an insurance policy and
refuse to comply with policy requirements to submit to sworn examination
because criminal charges related to the cause of fire may be pending against
542.

Id.

543. Act of May 27, 1998, ch. 98-261, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 2278, 2278 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3)).
544. FLA. STAT. § 617.3075 (1997).

545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. § 617.3075(1).
Id. § 617.3075(2).
700 So. 2d 51 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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him. 551 So, the examination was again rescheduled and, once again, Fassi
failed to appear or respond. 2 Three months later, Fassi wished to have the
examination conducted but American responded that it was too late. 553
The
trial court granted summary judgment after Fassi filed suit on the policy.
The appellate court agreed with American's contentions. 4 Fassi was
given one last chance to explain the refusal to cooperate, and failure to
respond would lead to denial of the claim.555 Since Fassi did not explain, no
further notice was required on American Fire's behalf. The final letter to
Fassi was only an opportunity to explain, not a chance to participate. The
court concluded that five opportunities to participate were enough.
XII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Bell v. Kornblatt.557 The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, had
affirmed the county court's final judgment of eviction based upon failure to
pay the rent.55 8 The tenant sought certiorari review in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal on the theory that the county court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the three-day notice the tenant received did not comply
with the statute.55 9 A number of county and circuit court decisions supported
that argument, 56° but the district court rejected it concluding that compliance
with the statute was merely a condition precedent to eviction. 561 The court
reasoned that under earlier versions of the statute, the tenant could waive its
right to a three-day notice, and such ability to waive would be inconsistent
551. Id.
552. Fassi,700 So. 2d at 52.
553. Id. at 53.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. 705 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
558. Id. at 113-14.
559. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.56(3) (1995)).
560. Id. (citing Cook v. Arrowhead Mobile Home Community, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 26
(3d Cir. Ct. 1991); Johnson v. Kallioinen, 16 Fla. Supp. 2d 86 (15th Cir. Ct. 1986); Archer v.
Jackson, 2 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 225 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1994); Shapiro v. Puche, 1 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 409 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1993); Pearson v. Sims, I Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 408
(Broward Cty. Ct. 1993); Pappas v. Kartub, 2 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 59 (Broward Cty. Ct.
1993); Broward Gardens Assocs., Ltd. v. Walker, I Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 155 (Broward Cty.
Ct. 1992); Marcrum Management Co. v. Phillips, 40 Fla. Supp. 2d 198 (Broward Cty. Ct.
1990); Garcia v. Ruiz, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 176 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1991); Labrada v. Barrios, 44 Fla.
Supp. 2d 140 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1990); Metropolitan Dade County v. Dansey, 43 Fla. Supp. 2d
169 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1990); and Kosta v. Bernstein, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 480 (Sarasota Cty.
Ct. 1996)).
561. Bell, 705 So. 2d at 114.
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with the court being deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. 562 As this
appears to be the only district court decision in the state, it is binding
throughout the state and has the effect, at least for the time being, of
overruling all inconsistent circuit and county court decisions.
Charlemagne v. Francis.563 Injured by a fall allegedly caused by a
defective carpet, the roommate of the tenant sued the landlord.5 64 The tenant
testified that she had repeatedly notified the landlord about the problems
with the carpet. However, the apartment manager testified that he had not
been notified. Moreover, he testified that he never saw any problems with
the carpet.565 The person who cleaned the carpet before the tenancy began
also testified that the carpet had no defects.5 6 The landlord, thereafter,
conjectured that any defects in the carpet, if they existed at all, might have
been caused by the tenant's furniture movers. Over the tenant's objection,
the landlord got a jury instruction that, inter alia, "the landlord [is] not
responsible to the tenant.., for [defects] created or caused by... person on
the premises with the tenant's consent."567 The jury returned a verdict for
the landlord and the tenant appealed. 8
The fourth district reversed, finding the instruction improper on two
grounds. 569 First, the instruction about the landlord's responsibility to the
tenant under section 83.51 of the Florida Statutes relates to the statutory
warranty of the premises by the landlord to the tenant.
It has no
applicability to an action for common law negligence.5 71 The only defense
would be comparative negligence of the defendant or the superseding
negligence of others.
Second, there was no testimony that the defect
might have been caused by third parties such as furniture movers. 573
Comptech International,Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd.574 This
involved a commercial lease. Pursuant to an agreement to lease additional
space, the parties agreed that the landlord would build offices in part of the

562. Id.
563. 700 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
564. Id. at 158.
565. Id. at 158-59.
566. Id. at 159.
567. Id. at 158.
568. Charlemagne,700 So. 2d at 158.
569. Id. at 159.
570. Id. at 160.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Charlemagne, 700 So. 2d at 160.
574. 711 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), replacing original opinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App., Sep. 17, 1997).

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:229

original space. 575 The tenant, claiming its office space and computers were
damaged by the unworkmanlike and untimely construction of the landlord's
office space, brought suit against the landlord based on the following
theories: 1) negligent construction; 2) violation of the building code; 3) rent
had been illegally collected; and 4) negligence in the selection of
contractors. The first three were dismissed with prejudice and the court
granted summary judgment for the landlord on the last.516 The tenant
brought this appeal, which turned on the question of whether the
577 tenant's
recovery on the tort theories was barred by the economic loss rule.
The economic loss rule draws the line between recovery in tort and in
contract. It provides that tort recovery is prohibited "when a product
damages itself, causing economic injury, but does not cause personal injury
or damage to any property other than itself."5 78 Thus, if the defective product
damages other property, the economic loss rule does not bar recovery.
However, the first question here was whether the tenant's office space and
computers were "'other' property." The majority, in an extensive opinion
written by Judge Gersten, thought not. 579 Judge Cope, in an equally
extensive dissent, reached the contrary conclusion.5 80 It is a close call.
Eventually it will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida, but
until that time, tenants would be well advised to provide by contract for
protection from this type of harm.
81
The majority and the dissent also disagreed on the indemnity clause. s
It provided that the tenant would indemnify the landlord for all claims of
every kind arising from the use or occupancy of the premises. The majority
found this language supported its conclusion that the tenant should be
limited to contract damages because the parties negotiated the allocation of
risk and agreed to place it on the tenant.
In contrast, the dissent focused
on the omission
of
specific
language
of
an
intent
to indemnify the landlord
•
•
•
583
against its own negligence.
Such language would be necessary to
overcome the distaste for agreements that protect a party from its own
wrongful conduct. 584 Thus, it should not protect this landlord. 585
575. Id. at 1256-57.
576. Id. at 1257.
577. Id.
578. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993).
579. Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1256-63.
580. Id. at 1263-68 (Cope, J.,
dissenting).
581.
Id. at 1261, 1265.
582. Id. at 1261.
583. Id. at 1265. (Cope, J., dissenting).
584. Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1265.
585. Id.

1998]

Brown / Grohman

There was also disagreement as to whether the economic loss rule bared
recovery for the building code violations. 586 Section 553.84 of the Florida
Statutes provides: "Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any
person or party... damaged as a result of a violation [of the Florida
Building Codes Act] has a cause of action [in any court of competent
jurisdiction] against the [person or] party who committed the violation. 5 87
The dissent interpreted the phrase, "[n]otwithstanding any other
remedies" available as creating an exception to the economic loss rule
because the rule turns on the available of the contract remedy. 588 The
majority, however, pointed out that the economic loss rule has been applied
to bar statutory tort actions in the same way that it bars common law tort
actions. 9
Unfortunately, the statutory phrase is capable of both
interpretations, and only a trip to the supreme court or legislative
clarification will settle the question.
Markell v. Mi Casa, Ltd.51° The tenant sued after being injured when
she tripped on the rubber weather stripping on the threshold of her
apartment's front door.5 9' Unfortunately, the building had been sold only
two weeks before the 'accident. 92 In response to the present and former
landlords' motions for summary judgment, she produced the affidavit of an
expert in risk analysis. He stated that: 1) the weather stripping was
improperly designed, installed and maintained; 2) it constituted a "hidden
trap" to someone using that doorway; 3) it would not necessarily have been
visible to a person entering or leaving the apartment; 4) it would have been
easily noticed by a "minimally experienced maintenance or repairindividual
during the normal course of inspection at any time after the initial
installation;" and 5) the weather stripping area was not regularly
inspected. 3 The trial court granted summary judgment against the tenant.
She appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 95
Two rules were applicable regarding the landlord's duty in the absence
of a tenant waiver. First, "'the owner of a residential dwelling unit, who
leases it to a tenant for residential purposes, has a duty to reasonably inspect
the premises before allowing the tenant to take possession, and to make
therepairs necessary to transfer a reasonably safe dwelling unit to the
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

Id. at 1257, 66-68.
Id. at 1266 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1989)).
Id.
Comptech Int'l, 711 So. 2d at 1258.
711 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

591.

Id. at 584.

592.
593.

Id.
Id. at 585.

594.

Id. at 584.

595.

Markell, 711 So. 2d at 586.
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tenant.'596 Secondly, once notified of a dangerous defect, the landlord has a
continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to make repairs.597 The expert's
affidavit left questions of fact as to how these rules should apply to this
case. Was the property in an unreasonably dangerous condition? Had it
been delivered that way, or had it become dangerous after delivery? Was the
prior or new landlord on constructive notice because it should have known?
Was the tenant also negligent? If so, how would the parties' negligence be
assessed for comparative negligence analysis purposes? In light of the
unanswered questions, summary judgment should not have been granted. 598
Chief Judge Stone, however, dissented.5 99 He saw no evidence that the
landlords had notice of the dangerous condition or that they might have been
on constructive 60notice. 60 Without notice, they could not be held liable under
the above rules. '
Morris Investment Partnershipv. Figueroa.60 2 The tenant leased space
for an automobile repair shop. Unfortunately, the space did not have enough
off-street parking to satisfy the zoning ordinance, so the tenant could not get
an occupational license. That did not stop the tenant from opening for
business while the landlord tried to solve the zoning problem. After the
landlord's efforts failed, the tenant vacated the premises. The landlord sued
for unpaid rent from the period tenant was in possession, accelerated rent,
and compensation for the expenses incurred in the zoning dispute. The trial
court, following a nonjury trial, granted judgment for the tenant on all counts
and declared the lease to be null and void. 6° The district court reversed. 6°
The district court reasoned that declaring the lease to be null and void
605
was inappropriate because the tenant had never sought rescission.
Furthermore, tenant's remaining in possession and opening for business
would have been a bar to rescission anyway, and remaining in possession
would have prevented tenant from raising constructive eviction as a defense
to the rent suit. 606 Therefore, the landlord was entitled to rent for the period
when the tenant was in possession of the premises. 6 07 But why only for the
time tenant was in possession?
596.

Id. at 585 (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1329-30 (Fla. 1981)).

597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.

Id.
Id. at 586.
Id. (Stone, J., dissenting).
Markell, 711 So. 2d at 586.
Id.
698 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Figueroa,698 So. 2d at 290-91.
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Taking the court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, the landlord
should have recovered the accelerated rent. The lease had a rent acceleration
clause. The lease had not been rescinded. The tenant vacated while the lease
was still in effect, so the landlord could exercise the acceleration clause.
When the tenant later vacated, it was too late because the accelerated rent
was already due; so the tenant could not raise constructive eviction as a
defense to a suit for accelerated rent. However, the court failed to explain
why the landlord did not win on this point as well.
Allowing rent only until the tenant vacated is consistent with an
application of the construction eviction defense, i.e., the landlord was
entitled to rent only until the tenant was evicted, constructively, by the
landlord and not thereafter.
However, that is inconsistent with what the
court said.
Perhaps the court was basing its conclusion on failure of
consideration or on the doctrine of commercial frustration. Perhaps the court
was basing its opinion on an application of the doctrine of mitigation of
damages. Perhaps the court was granting the landlord compensation for the
use and occupancy of the land, a form of restitution damages, but that would
only make sense if the court granted rescission or found the lease to be void
ab initio. Perhaps ...
Rodriguez v. Brutus.
On the lot in question were a house and a
shed. 6 10 The tenants had an oral lease for the house that specifically
excluded the shed. The tenants were specifically warned that the shed
contained a working power saw and that they were not to enter. In turn, the
tenants specifically warned their daughter that she was forbidden from
entering the shed. There was no problem until the daughter took a wood
shop class. Although she had been warned about the dangers of this type of
saw by her teacher, she decided to try out the saw in the shed. As there was
no door, she had no trouble entering. The experiment went badly, and she
lost part of her thumb.6 1' The jury held the landlord eighty percent negligent
and it entered a final judgment of $300,000 for the tenants.
On appeal, the
Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 1 3
The critical point was that the shed was not part of the leased
premises. 6 14 Consequently, the daughter was in the shed as either an
uninvited licensee or as a trespasser. If she was an uninvited licensee, the
landlord's duty to her was to refrain from wanton negligence or willful
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.

Id. at 290.
702 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1303.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rodriguez, 702 So. 2d at 1303.
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misconduct. 615 If she were a trespasser, the landlords' only duty to her was
to refrain from committing willful or wanton injury so long as the attractive
616
Unfortunately, the court failed to reveal
nuisance doctrine does not apply.
why the saw was not an attractive nuisance. However, the daughter had
been warned of the danger and admittedly was well aware of it, so the
breached this duty to her. Consequently, they could not be
landlord had
6 17not
liable.
held
Schroeder v. Johnson.6 18 The lease provided the tenant with the right
"to extend this lease for successive five (5) year periods," but the lease was
silent on how many renewals would be allowed. 6 19 The trial judge, after
hearing parol evidence, interpreted this to mean that the tenant had the right
to renew as long as she wished. 62 The district court reversed. 62 1 It
acknowledged that the use of the plural word "periods" indicated more than
one renewal, but that was tempered by the policy against perpetual
leases. 622 The traditional rule is that a court should not find a lease to be
perpetual in the absence of unambiguous language indicating that intent, and
that language was missing from this lease. Therefore, the district court
concluded that the lease gave623the tenant the fewest possible number of plural
renewals; i.e., two renewals.
Judge W. Sharp strongly dissented. 62 In this case, the lease provision
was not clear. 62 The trial judge heard the parol evidence, and evidence in
the record supported his conclusions as to the parties' intent. 626 The policy
against perpetual renewals is an ancient one that has produced strained
constructions. It has outlived its original purpose and should not be used to
trump the intent of the parties, particularly because interpreting the lease to
provide a human tenant with the right to renew during her life would be far
less than perpetual.
Serchay v. NTS Fort Lauderdale Office Joint Venture.627 The office
space was leased to Lane, P.A. and Serchay, P.A. Lane, P.A. was the law
firm of Paul Lane. Serchay, P.A. was the accounting firm of Alan Serchay.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Id.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1303-04.
696 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Schroeder, 696 So. 2d at 499.
Id. at 500-03 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
Id. at 503.
Id.
707 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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Lane, P.A. subleased space to Coven, P.A. Both corporate entities were
dissolved for failure to file annual reports. Later, Coven and Lane formed a
new firm, Coven & Lane, P.A., and Alan Serchay
formed a new accounting
6
firm, A. Serchay Accounting Services, P.A. 2
After the tenants vacated the premises and stopped paying rent, the
landlord brought this action for unpaid rent. The tenants reinstated the
defunct corporations to defend on the theory of constructive eviction.
Following trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the landlord against
the defendants, including Coven & Lane, P.A. and A. Serchay Accounting
Services, P.A.629 The district court affirmed the judgment against A.
Serchay 63Accounting
Services, P.A., but reversed the decision against Coven
0
& Lane.
Since these corporations were not parties to the written lease, they
could be held liable for the unpaid rent only if they were successor entities
or if they had de facto merged with the tenant entities. 63 , A successor entity
"'is merely a continuation or reincarnation of the earlier entity under a
different name"' or in a different form.632 The key element is "'common
identity of officers, directors and stockholders"' between the original and
successor entity. 633 Similarly, to find a defacto merger requires "'continuity
of the selling corporation evidenced by the same management, personnel,
assets... physical location... stockholders, accomplished by paying for the
acquired corporation with shares of stock; ' 634
a dissolution of the selling
corporation; and assumption of the liabilities."'
As to the accounting firm, there appeared to be no question that the
essentials of the earlier and later firms were the same. However, there was
insufficient evidence that the new law firm, consisting of two lawyers, was a
successor to the earlier solo practice of one partner, or that there was a de
facto merger of the earlier solo practice into the new partnership. Although
there was evidence that the new firm used the space of the earlier solo
practice and some of the equipment and personnel, it was not enough in that
the new firm had a new officer and shareholder, Coven, and there was635no
evidence that it had acquired the assets and liabilities of the solo practice.
628.
629.

Id.at 959.
Id. at 959.

630. Id. at 960.
631. Id.
632. Serchay, 707 So. 2d at 960 (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
633. Id. (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
634. Id. (quoting Munim v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 153-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
635.

Id.
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Siegel v. Deerwood Place Corp.636 The tenants brought suit for injuries
one suffered from a fall down the stairs. They produced the affidavit of an
expert that construction staples were found in the area where the victim
allegedly tripped on the stairway carpeting. They claimed that such staples
led to the inference that the carpet was improperly installed or repaired and
that there was a presumption that the landlord knew of the defect. The trial
court, however, granted summaY63Tudgrent to the landlord, and the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed.
The rule is that, absent a waiver, the landlord has a "'continuing duty to
exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous defective conditions"' of which
he has notice. 638 The mere existence of the construction staples alone was
not enough to establish that the landlord was on notice of the defect or had
attempted to conceal it. There was no evidence to establish when the staples
were installed, who installed them, or how long they were installed before
the accident. Consequently, the district court affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment.639

XIV. LIENS
Morse Diesel Internationalv. 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc.640 The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed a peremptory writ of mandamus
authorizing release of a cash bond in favor of 2000 Williams Island
("Williams"), owner and developer of a 280 unit highrise condominium
project. 641 The court remanded with directions that Williams
redeposit
64
disbursed proceeds from the cash bond pending further orders. 2
Morse Diesel sued Williams Island "for money due under a
construction contract." 643 The parties entered into an agreement that
provided Morse Diesel with a lien on a pool of twenty condo units to secure
644
the claim. Morse agreed to release its lien rights as to the other units. 645
"Williams ...posted a bond on a prorated basis as to five of the units."

Morse asserted additional claims when another dispute arose between the
parties. Williams later "filed an emergency motion for the clerk to transfer
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.

701 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. atll91.
Id. (quoting Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981)).
Id. at 1192.
698 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 311.
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all of the [existing] liens to its cash bond and to reduce Morse46Diesel's
amended claim of lien ... when certain subcontractors were paid."6
The trial court allowed the lien transfer to a cash bond but denied
Williams' request for reduction of the bond.647 Since Williams failed to
receive the bond reduction, it filed for a writ of mandamus directing the
clerk to disburse the cash bond as per section 713.24(4) of the Florida
Statutes.
The lower court
the clerk to release the cash bond.64 9
On appeal, the court concludeddirected
the following:
the lower court abused its discretion in granting the writ of
mandamus where (1) the record did not disclose Williams Island's
clear legal right to the same in that a genuine dispute existed as to
whether Morse Diesel's claim of lien had expired by operation of
law; (2) Williams Island had another adequate legal remedy to
procure the release of these funds; and (3) Morse Diesel was an
interested party to the mandamus
proceeding who had not been
650
brought before the court.
To receive a writ of mandamus, "petitioner must demonstrate a clear
legalright to the performance of a ministerial duty by the respondent and that
no other adequate remedy exists., 651 The court found that "Williams Island
did not establish a clear legal right to [a] mandamus where the clerk's
answer.., and defenses created a genuine issue of fact about whether
Morse['s] ... claim of lien had expired and/or been satisfied. 6 52 Moreover,
"Williams did not allege in its complaint that it had no adequate remedy at
law. ' 65 3 Just because Williams was unsuccessful
654 in getting the bond reduced
did not signify such remedies were inadequate.
The court also held that the writ should not have been entered when
"Morse Diesel was an interested party ... but was given no notice and
opportunity to-be heard on the issues."655 In addition, it was an abuse of
discretion to grant the writ to release the cash bond when the funds were in

646.
647.
648.
649.
650.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 713.24(4) (1997)).
Id. at 312.
Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.

651.

Id. See also Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla.

1992).
652.
653.
654.

Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.
Id.
Id.

655.

Id.
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dispute between the parties in another pending action. 656 The lower court
should have required Williams Island to redeposit disbursed proceeds of the
cash bond.657
Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window Co. 658 The issue before the court
was "whether the trial court erred when applying section 55.10(1) Florida
Statutes, , to Appellee [Sterling's] judgment lien on Appellant [Robinson's]
realty. 59
The trial court determined that Sterling Door had a valid lien on
Robinson's property. 66 Robinson claimed the lien was defective because
Sterling's address was lacking as required per section 55.10(1) of the
since
the
Florida Statutes.6 6 1 The trial court held the statute was satisfied 66
2
names of the attorneys involved were included in the judgment lien.
Section 55.10 of the Florida Statutes specifically recognized: "'[a]
judgment, order, or decree does not become a lien on real estate unless the
address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment... is
contained in the judgment.' ' '663 Since courts must give effect to statutory
language, the appellee's address must be on the judgment lien. 664 Without
the address, there was no lien on Robinson's real estate.
Wolf v. Spariosu.665 This court reversed final summary judgment of
foreclosure which declared the Wolf Group's lien to be superior to the
interests of all appellees except Maysonet Landscape Company's claim of
lien. 6 66 The court agreed with Wolf Group that its mortgage gained priority
over Maysonet through the doctrine of equitable subrogation or conventional
subrogation.667
Maysonet and Spariosu entered into a contract for landscaping materials
and services for the property. 668 Maysonet filed and duly recorded a claim669of
lien. At that time, two existing mortgages were recorded on the property.
A few months later, Spariosu executed a note and mortgage to City First
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

Id.at 313.
Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 313.
698 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 571.
Id.

661.

Id. See also FLA.

662.
663.
(1997)).
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.

STAT.

§ 55.10 (1997).

Id.
Robinson, 698 So. 2d at 571 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Id.
706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 882.
Id.
Id. at 882.
Id.

FLA. STAT.

§ 55.10
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Mortgage Corp. Two prerequisites existed for the loan to Spariosu. First,
the proceeds from City First's loan "were to be used.., for the purpose of
satisfying the two previously recorded mortgages." 670 Second, "City First's
671
mortgage would be substituted in the place of [the] two prior mortgages."
City's mortgage was later assigned to the Wolf Group.
"Maysonet sued the borrowers... and recorded its notice of lis
pendens." 672 When the borrowers defaulted on City's loan, Wolf Group
sought to foreclose the mortgage, and Maysonet was later named as a
defendant in the complaint. "The lower court.., entered a final judgment of
mortgage foreclosure finding the Wolf Group's interest... superior to the
interests of all defendants except Maysonet." 6 Y3 Subrogation is defined as:
"substitution of one person to the position of another with reference
to a legal claim or right .... Th[is] doctrine is generally invoked
when one person has satisfied the obligations of another and equity
compels that the person discharging the debt stand in the shoes of
the person whose claim has been discharged, thereby
succeeding to
674
the rights and priorities of the original creditor."
This court found that "under the doctrine of conventional subrogation,
675
the Wolf Group's lien should have been.., superior to Maysonet's lien."
Evidence showed that "the borrowers had an agreement with... City First
for City First's mortgaze to be substituted in the place of the two prior...
satisfied mortgages." 6
"Conventional subrogation" is defined by the
following:
"'[It] arises by virtue of an agreement, express or implied, that a
third person or one having no previous interest in the matter
involved shall, upon discharging an obligation or paying a debt, be
substituted in the place of the creditor with respect to such rights,
remedies,677or securities as [the creditor] may have against the
debtor."'

670. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 883.
674. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed. Says. &
Loan Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
675. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 884.
676. Id. at 884.
677. Id. at 883 (quoting Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 So. 742 (1918) (quoting Kent
v. Bailey, 164 N.W. 852, 853 (Iowa 1917))).
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The court concluded that the Wolf Group's lien was entitled topriority
67
over Maysonet's lien under the doctrine of conventional subrogation. /
Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater,Inc.679 The court affirmed final
judgment in a construction lien action filed by subcontractors and
materialmen. 68 Evidence supported the trial court's decision that all but one
of the claims were valid and timely and created liens against the property.681
In 1992, Zalay contracted with Charles Walker Corporation to build a
home for $360,000. Eventually, Zalay had to make only one final payment
in the amount of $45,267.07. Although most of the work was completed on
the home "[s]everal of the subcontractors and materialmen remained
unpaid." 68 Three lienors recorded claims totaling about' $31,000 and
"Artistic Surfaces ...presented an untimely claim for $2,600. 683
The issue before the court was "whether the language of section 713.06
[of the Florida Statutes] permits the attorneys' fees and costs ultimately
awarded under section 713.29 to become a lien against the property. ' 684 The
court concluded "that the limitation in section 713.06(3)(h) is intended to
define the extent of the lien for the lienor's materials or services prior to
litigation, and is not intended to preclude a lien for costs and attorneys' fees
in a lien foreclosure action. ' 685 The court found it important to examine
section 713.06(1). 686 This statute provides:
A materialman or laborer, either of whom is not in privity with the
owner, or a subcontractor... who complies with the provisions of
this part and is subject to the limitations thereof, has a lien on the
real property
improved for any money that is owed to him for
687
labor.

There is nothing
in this statute that expressly provides a lien for attorneys'
68
fees and costs.
Construction lien statutes should not be liberally construed in favor of
any person. 689 "[A]ttorneys' fees awarded under section 713.29 are not an
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.

Id. at 884.
700 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.06(1) (1993)).
Id.
Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 17.
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element of damages, but are 'taxed as part of... costs. ' 69 0 The court saw
"no reason why the costs involved in a construction lien action should not be
691
included within the lien.
Legislative changes to Chapter255 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
With respect to public lands and property, section 255.05(2)(a) now
provides that where a claimant is no longer furnishing labor on a project, "a
contractor, or [its] agent or attorney may elect to shorten the prescribed
time.., within which an action to enforce any claim against a payment
bond" may be made. 69 This may be done by filing a "NOTICE OF
CONTEST OF CLAIM AGAINST PAYMENT BOND."693 The form and
procedure for such are set out in the above referenced statute.69 4
Legislative changes to Chapter 713 of the Florida Statutes include, but
are not limited to, the following:
Section 713.01(12) is amended to include in the definition of
"[i]mprove" a provision for solid waste collection or disposal on the site of
the improvement. 695
Likewise, the definitions for "[i]mprovement",
"[s]ubcontractor,"
and
"[s]ub-subcontractor"
have been amended to reflect
696
the same.

Section 713.23(1)(e) has been amended to provide a shortening of time
697
for a contractor to claim against a payment bond.
This statute provides for
a form for filing a "NOTICE OF CONTEST OF CLAIM AGAINST
PAYMENT BOND." 69 8 Comparatively, section 713.235(1) provides for a
form for a "[w]aiver of right... against the payment bond." 6 9

690. Id. at 18 (quoting Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969)).
691. Id.
692. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 913, 914 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 255.05(2)(a)1).
693. Id.

694.

Id.

695. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 917, 917 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.01(12)).
696. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 917, 917 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.01(13), (26), (27)).
697. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 6, 1998 Fla. Laws 920, 921 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 713.23(l)(e)).
698. Id.
699. Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-135, § 7, 1998 Fla. Laws 921, 921 (to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 713.235).
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XV. MORTGAGES

Alafaya Square Ass'n. v Great Western Bank.700 The court granted
appellee's motion for rehearing of the opinion dated February 7, 1997.0
This opinion was entered in place of the previous one. 02 The court reversed
the trial court's order appointing a receiver because "there was no showing
that Alafaya wasted or impaired the.., real property. 70 3 Alafaya owned a
shopping center "encumbered by a mortgage in favor of the appellee, WHCOne."7 If there was a default on the mortgage, Alafaya agreed to have a
receiver appointed. After the loan matured, Alafaya did in fact default on
payment, and WJHC-One70°("WHC") sued to foreclose and requested the
appointment of a receiver.
The trial court granted WHC's motion to sequester the rents received
from the shopping center's tenants. 7° All rent collected was placed in
escrow, and Alafaya could not expend funds from the account without the
court's approval. Alafaya requested use of escrow funds from WHC to do
repairs, but after Alafaya received no response, it requested permission from
the trial court to expend the funds. 70 7 Alafaya later requested WHC's
consent to withdraw escrow funds for payment of real estate taxes. 70 8 WHC
again failed to answer. In response to Alafaya's request for funds to repair,
"WHC filed a motion 7for
°9 appointment of receiver alleging an 'apparent
waste to the property."'
The trial court granted WHC's motion for the appointment of a
receiver, and Alafaya appealed arguing that evidence failed to show Alafaya
wasted or impaired the property. 10 "The appointment of a receiver in a
foreclosure action is not a matter of right.., it is an extraordinary
remedy. 71' The receiver's role "is to preserve the value of the secured
property. ' 12 The trial court can appoint a receiver, but it can only do so if
700. 700 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
701. Id.at 39.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 39.
706. Id.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 40.
711. Id. (citing Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So. 2d 233, 234
(Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1994)).
712. Id.(citing Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So. 2d 233, 235
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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evidence suggests 7the
secured property was being wasted or subject to
3
serious risk of loss* 1
The appellate court agreed that "the evidence... [did] not constitute
waste or impairment." 71 4 The only waste could be "the disrepair to the
parking lot and the exterior paint." 715 Alafaya took timely action to get
WHC to release the funds. As such, there could be no waste since the failure
to repair was due to WHC's refusal to release the funds. 7 16 The court
717
reversed because the facts did not justify the remedy of receivership.
7
18
Beach v. Ocwen FederalBank. In 1986, the appellants, the Beaches,
"refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western
Bank." 71 9 In 1991, the appellants stopped making their mortgage payment,
and in 1992 Great Western began this foreclosure proceeding.
The
appellants "acknowledged their default but raised affirmative defenses,
alleging... that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth
in Lending Act gave them the right under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 to rescind the
mortgage agreement. 72 ' The appellee, Ocwen, argued that the right to
rescind expired since Section 1635(f) of the United States Code provides
that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the closing of the
loan. 722 However, the appellants argued the three years provision only
pertains to the actual affirmative right of rescission and that there is no
statute of limitations or expiration of permitting rescission by a recoupment
defense.723 The trial court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Court of Florida rejected that defense, holding that the right to
rescind expired' in three years under the plain language of section
1635(f). 724 The United 7States
Supreme Court affirmed the decision made by
5
all of the courts below. 2
The purpose of the Act is "'to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
713. Id. (citing Atco Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, 523 So. 2d 747,
750 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
714. Id.
715.

Alafaya Square, 700 So. 2d at 40.

716. Id.
717. Id.
at 41.
718. 118 S.Ct. 1408 (1998).
719. Id. at 1408.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. Ocwen, 118 S. Ct. at 1409.
724. Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1997); Beach v. Great W. Bank,
670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1994).
725. Ocwen, 118 S. Ct. at 1411.
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credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to
protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit
card practices.' ''726 The Act gives the borrower a right to rescind without
being liable for any finance or other charge; however, this right expires three
years "'after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of
the property, whichever occurs first.' ' ,727 The Supreme Court held that the
Act does not give the borrower a right of rescission as an affirmative defense
after this three-year period.7 28
The Court stated the question to decide was "whether [section] 1635(f)
is a statute of limitation, that is, 'whether [it] operates, with the lapse of
time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim' or 'merely
to bar the remedy for its enforcement.' ' ,729 The Court held that "the answer
is apparent from the plain language of [section] 1635(f). 7 3 ° The Court
stated that section 1635(f) states nothing about the time period in bringing an
action, but instead speaks only to when the right of rescission terminates;
therefore, the Supreme Court held the right was meant to be limited,731 and it
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida. 732
Blatchley v. Boatman's National Mortgage, Inc.733 The appellate court
affirmed an order denying Blatchley's motion to vacate the foreclosure sale
of his home. 3 The summary final judgment in foreclosure stated the sale
date was January 9, 1997.
Boatman's moved for an order changing the
sale date to January 7, because the ninth was a "scrivener's error" and
because the published notice of foreclosure sale contained the correct date of
January 7, 1997. 7366 The court granted the date change. 737
However, Blatchley failed to get notice of the new sale date until a day
73
after
thetoactual
sale the
tookdate
place.
In addition,
Blatchley
only got Boatman's
739
motion
change
on 8January
10, 1997.
Blatchley
sought to

726.
Publications
727.
728.
729.
356, 358-59
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.

Id. at 1409-10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1994)); see Mourning v. Family
Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 363-68 (1973).
Beach, 118 S. Ct. at 1410 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1635(0 (1994)).
Id.
Id. at 1412 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U.S.
& n.4 (1943)).
Id. at 1412. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993).
Beach, 118 S. Ct. at 1412.
Id. at 1413.
706 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 317.

735.

Id.

736.

Id.

737.

Id.

738.

Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 317.

739.

Id.
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vacate the sale, since he never got proper notice of the correct sale date. As
such, he could not exercise his right of redemption or reinstatement and
could not participate in the sale or protect his property interest. 740 "The trial
court denied the motion to vacate the sale," but gave Blatchley fifteen days
from the order date to pay the judgment amount.741 Instead of taking
advantage of the increased redemption period that was offered, Blatchley
filed a notice of appeal. 742
Section 45.031 of the FloridaStatutes requires that a "final judgment of
foreclosure specify a day for the sale and that the notice of the sale be
published for two weeks, the second of which publication 'shall be at least 5
days before the sale." 743 This statute was not satisfied. However, even
though Blatchley did not receive proper notice, the court remedied the error
by extending the redemption period. 744 "Foreclosure suits are governed by
equitable principles." 745- The trial court "did equity" by extending the
74 [would]
be accomplished by reversing for
"[N]othing
redemption period. 746sale
[
date."
and
judgment
new
a
Clearman v. Dalton.748 Clearman recovered a judgment for $150,000
against Dalton. Dalton filed for bankruptcy and revealed two secured
mortgages against his homestead. The first was in favor of his son in the
amount of $15,000, and the second was in favor of Monticello Bank for
$50,000.749 The mortgage in favor of the son was never recorded, and the
bank's mortgage was recorded but not delivered. 75o "The trustee...
thus
obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court
,~ avoiding the mortgages,
,751
the
estate."'
51
The
'for
the
benefit
of
preserving the avoided obligations
the
the
Clearmans
who
recorded
the
mortgages
to
trustee assigned
the
and
preserving
assignment and judenents avoiding the mortgages
avoided obligations.
The trial court denied the foreclosure petition filed by Clearman.7 53 The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that section 544 of chapterll of
740.
741.
742.
743.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 317-18.
at 318.
Id.
Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318 (quoting FLA. STAT. 45.031 (1997)).

744.
745.
746.
747.

Id.
Id. (citing FLA.

748.

708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

749.
750.
752.

Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id.

753.

Clearman,708 So. 2d at 325.

751.

STAT.

§ 702.01 (1995)).

Id.
Id.
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the United States Code did "not place the Trustee (or the Trustee's
assignees) in the place of the former mortgagees with the power to
foreclose. ' 754 The court believed the bankruptcy estate had755 an assignable
interest in the mortgage subject to Dalton's homestead claim.
The assignees could assert their interest and require Dalton to establish
"fact of homestead. 756 Filing of judgments entered by the Bankruptcy Court
did not constitute slander of title. 57 When the Daltons "filed their
bankruptcy petition and submitted their property, subject to provable
exemptions," they could not complain "if the assignee of the estate's
758 interest
requires that they prove entitlement to the homestead exemption."
Crane v. Barnett Bank.759 The court affirmed an amended final
judgment as to the terms of rescission of the mortgage agreement, except as
to the effective date the rate of interest charged to the borrower should
run. 76 The court reversed the denial of the borrower's motion for partial
summary judgment on liability and vacated the provision for foreclosure of
the subject mortgage if 76
the borrower failed to satisfy the conditions for
rescission within 45 days. '
"The bank sued for foreclosure when a construction loan matured and
the borrower's wife refused to sign a modification of [their] mortgage
agreement., ' 762 The borrower "had not defaulted under the construction loan
phase of the agreement" since the borrower's payments had been refused,
' 763
thus "preventing [such] borrower from performing under the agreement.
The borrower's bank had no written agreement that required the wife's
signature on the mortgage.7 4 In addition, the bank's allegations of liability
against the borrower did not include the wife's refusal to sign a mortgage
modification.76 5
On appeal, borrower claimed the trial judge erred in denying his motion
for summary judgment because the borrower had offered to make payments
but was refused.766 "The trial court should have granted the borrower's

754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Clearman,708 So. 2d at 325.
759. 698 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
760. Id. at 905.
761. Id. at 905-06.
762. Id. at 903.
763. Id.
764. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 903.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 904.
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motion for partial summary judgment. 767 "[T]he bank's complaint... did
not include allegations that the borrower defaulted by failing to have his wife
sign the mortgage modification.[768 "IT]he sole basis for default was the
borrower's failure to pay the mortgage. ' 769 As such, no material issue of fact
on the question of liability for foreclosure existed.
The second issue on appeal was "whether the trial court's order
allowing rescission 'ab initio' of the parties' mortgage agreement properly
restored each party to status quo." 770 "[Tihe trial court erred in assessing two
different rates of interest
as a condition for rescission of the parties'
771
agreement 'ab initio."'
[Since] there was only one integrated mortgage agreement... and
its nullification is "ab initio," the borrower should not be penalized
with a higher rate of interest if it was the bank's own refusal to
accept payments that led to recission, simply because
the mortgage
772
agreement provided for two phases of the loan.
The appellate court found no error in the imposition of a "costs of
funds" rate of interest and payment required by the borrower as a cost of
rescission.773 It had "no record establishing the basis for foreclosure within
45 days if the borrower fails to make rescission as required in the amended
final judgment." 774
Since the trial court "erred in denying the borrower's motion for partial
summary judgment on the bank's action for foreclosure," the bank had "no
basis for foreclosure under the mortgage agreement of the parties even if 'the
775
borrower [could not] restore the bank to status quo in 45 days.
"'[F]oreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied where.., payment
was not made due to... excusable neglect, coupled with some conduct of
the mortgagee which in a measure contributed to the failure to pay when
due."' 776 Acceleration of the balance and foreclosure of the mortgage
agreement was declared premature on this record.77 7
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
App. 1970)
777.

Id.
Id.
Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 904-05.
Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id. (quoting Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256-57 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
(citing Lunn Woods v. Lowery, 577 So. 2d 705 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).
Id.
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Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.

The issue on appeal was

"whether a mortgage lender's payment of a 'yield spread premium' to a
mortgage broker violates the antikickback provision of the Real Estate
780
Settlement Procedures Act" ("RESPA"). 779
Inland gave Culpepper a federally insured home mortgage loan
However, rather than dealing direct with Inland, Culpepper dealt only with
"On December 7,
the mortgage broker, Premiere Mortgage Company.7
1995, Premiere received a rate sheet from Inland and informed the
Culpeppers that a 30-year loan was available at a 7.5% interest rate. 782
Culpepper accepted the rate. However, Culpepper did not know that the rate
"was higher than Inland's par rate on [the] 30-year loans and carried a yield
spread premium of 1.675% of the loan amount. 78 3 Also, Culpepper did not
know that, as a result of the spread, Inland would be paying Premiere the
premium for the higher rate, even though Culpepper paid Premiere a loan
origination fee for its assisting them in obtaining and closing their loan.
Once having discovered this, Culpepper challenged "the legitimacy of
Inland's yield spread premium payment under RESPA. 784
Noting that no federal circuit court has addressed this issue and the
federal district courts that have addressed it are divided, the Eleventh Circuit
785
In so doing, it determined
Court of Appeals presented its own analysis.
that the yield spread premium under these facts was a nonexempt referral fee
violating RESPA section 2607(a).7 86

The court's analysis began with the statutory prohibitions and
exemptions. 787 Chapter 12, section 2607(a) of the United States Code
prohibits kickbacks and referral fees pursuant to an agreement regarding
Section 2607(c) exempts from that
federally related mortgages. 788
prohibition payment for goods or services actually performed.*
The first question was whether the payment to Premiere was a referral
fee. The court noted that it would constitute such if "(1) a payment of a
thing of value is (2) made pursuant to an agreement to refer settlement

778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.

132 F.3d 692 (1lth Cir. 1998).
Id. at 694 (citation omitted); see also 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1994).
Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.

787.
788.

Id.
12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1994)

789.

Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (1994)).
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business and (3) a referral actually occurs. '79° Here, Inland gave Premiere
value by paying the spread premium. The payment was pursuant to an
agreement to refer settlement business because the premium was to be paid
for Premiere's registering loans with Inland which funded the loans. There
was an actual referral when Premiere registered the loan with Inland. 791
The next question was whether section 2607(c) exempted the
transaction as a payment for goods or services. As to whether there was a
payment for goods, the appellate court noted this was not satisfied since
Inland funded the loan from the beginning. 792 It was not one owned by
Premiere and subsequently sold to Inland, as might be done with loans sold
in the permitted secondary mortgage market sales. The court noted that even
if Premiere were selling to Inland its right to direct the loan's disposition to a
number of wholesale lenders, such would not be an exempt sale of goods,
because 7aying
a referral fee for "directing" the business violates
RESPA.7 9 Therefore, the premium did not fit the sale of goods
.
exemption. 794
As to whether the premium was paid for Premiere's services, the
appellate court first looked at the services Premiere provided Culpepper,
obtaining and closing the loan.795 It found that the facts clearly showed
Culpepper had already paid Premiere for these services. 796 It also identified
logically that the premium for Premiere's generating a higher loan rate was
797 So, the premium could not be for a service to
not a service
798 to Culpepper.
Culpepper.
Next, the court examined whether the premium was for a service to
Inland. 799 However, there was no additional service to Inland. The premium
was based solely on the higher interest rate. s°° Because Premiere provided
no additional service to Inland over what it would have provided with a loan
of a lower rate, the payment did not fit the sale of services exemption.0 1
Having found the transaction violated RESPA's prohibitions, the court
reversed and remanded to the district court noting that the market value test
utilized by the trial court was inappropriate, since that test applies only to
790. Id. at 695-96.
791. Id. at 696.
792. Id.
793. Id.
794.
795.

Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
Id. at 696-97.

796.
797.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.

798.

Id.

799.

Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.

800.
801.

Id.
Id.
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facially permissible transactions, and it directed 80the
2 trial court to consider ab
initio Culpepper's motion for class certification.
Dove v. McCormick80 3 This court affirmed the trial court's order
granting final summary judgment in favor of McCormick.80 4 Dove executed
a mortgage in favor of The First, F.A. that encumbered Orange County real
property. 05 The transaction was subject to Truth in Lending Act
requirements. Later on, The First was declared "troubled," and the
Resolution•, Trust Corporation
("RTC") was appointed receiver to liquidate
806 ,,
The First's assets.
RTC assigned Dove's mortgage to Blazer Financial
Services," which later assigned the mortgage to John McCormick.8°7 Since
Dove failed to make monthly payments, McCormick sued to foreclose. 0 8
"The trial court entered final summary judgment [in McCormick's
favor], concluding that Dove's [posed] defenses pertaining to rescission and
recoupment were barred by the statute of limitations." 809 "Dove sought to
assert her statutory right to rescission based upon alleged violations of
[Truth in Lending Act] and Regulation Z."810 Dove also argued for
recoupment under section 1640(e)." The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's ruling in denying Dove's claim of recission because "'under Florida
law, an action for statutory right of rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635
may not be revived as a defense in recoupment
beyond the three-year
8 12
expiration period contained in section 1635(f).'
Section 1635(f) provides "when the right and the remedy are created by
the same statute, the limitations of the remedy are treated as limitations of
the right. ' 8 13 Dove may not seek the remedy of recission under the guise of
an affirmative defense of recoupment as a means of getting around the three
year statute of limitations. 14
Floyd v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. 15 Floyd "appeal[ed] a
post-judgment final order denying [the] 'Motion to Vacate Final Judgment
802.
803.

Id. at 697.
698 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

804.

Id. at 586.

805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
Babbit, 128
814.
815.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dove, 698 So. 2d at 586.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 588 (quoting Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 153 (Fla. 1997)).
Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588.; see Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Bowery v.
So. 801, 806 (Fla. 1930)).
Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588; Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695-96.
704 So. 2d I110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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and Set Aside Foreclosure Sale."' 81 6 Federal National filed a complaint
seeking to foreclose upon a first mortgage against Pamela Johnson. 1 The
mortgage encumbering the home was executed by Pamela and her then
husband, Vernon Floyd, in the original principal amount of $11,000. After
their divorce and Pamela's subsequent death, Vernon resided within the
home with the children, and the mortgage went into default with the
remaining balance of $3,045.96.818
Personal service of the complaint could not be made "because the
sheriff's process server could not locate the property." 81 9 The death of
Pamela was never confirmed. Federal National filed an amended complaint
naming Pamela Johnson or her heirs as defendant. Afterwards, Federal
National filed an Affidavit of Constructive Service alleging that the heirs
could not be found after diligent search. 820
After a second letter was sent to Vernon "specifying the amount
necessary to reinstate the mortgage," the trial court entered final summary
821
judgment in favor of Federal National.
Vernon was notified to vacate the
premises after the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied Vernon's motion
to set aside the sale. 822 The appellate court8agreed with Vernon that Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search. 2Y
Prior to constructive notice, a plaintiff must first file an affidavit
showing "that a diligent search has been made to discover the names and
addresses of the defendants." 82 4 In this case, Federal National's affidavit
stated that the Social Security Administration database was searched for
probate records and vital statistics without success. 825 The records did
confirm that Pamela Johnson was deceased. 826 Federal National did not
locate the property, inquire into those
827 in possession of the property, or talk
with neighbors, relatives, or friends.
Federal National's failure to pursue Vernon after his previous inquiries
about reinstating the mortgage shows that Federal National never

816.
817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.

Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Floyd,704 So. 2d at 1111.
Id.
Id. at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 49.03(1), .041(1), .071 (1995)).
Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
Id.
Id.
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"reasonably employ[ed] the knowledge at [its] command. 8 28 Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search and inquiry as required by the
constructive notice statute by completely ignoring the parties in possession
of the premises. 8829
,3
"Strict compliance with constructive service statutes is required. 830
The record showed a diligent effort to find the information needed in order
to accomplish personal service on those in possession of the property was
not made. 83 1 The appellate court believed Federal National "would have
learned additional facts necessary to accomplish personal service if someone
had found" •the property
and went there to see who had possession.832
•
833
Kirkland v. Miller. Kirkland appealed Final Judgment of Ejectment
awarded in favor of Sportsmen's, the "original owner of the subject real
property. ,,834 The trial court stated Kirkland only had "a beneficial interest
in an Illinois land trust. '835 Thus, ejectment was a proper remedy. The trial
court determined there was only a personal propert% interest, and foreclosure
was unnecessary. 836 The appellate court reversed. 8
Miller was a trustee with legal and equitable title to the property
identified in the trust. Sportsmen's and Mary Shearer, the principals, only
had a beneficial interest. Miller went about explaining the documents for
closing to Kirkland, which included a contract showing Sportsmen's sale of
the beneficial interest to Kirkland for $40,000. 838 Kirkland executed a
security agreement which assigned the beneficial interest back to Miller as
security for the $40,000 debt recognized as a "'Purchase Money Mortgage'
and include[ed] a charge for 'State Documentary Stamps on Deed. ' 9
Kirkland was to make monthly payments for twenty years, and if default
occurred, there would be an "automatic assignment" of the entire beneficial
interest to Sportsmen's. 840 After default, Miller was to sell the trust
property, and after costs and fees were paid out, the balance of the sale
828.
App. 1994)
1975))).
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.

Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
(quoting Canzoniero v. Canzoniero, 305 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Id.
Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
Id.
Id.at 1113.
702 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id.
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proceeds was to be delivered to Kirkland. Kirkland believed that a mortgage
was created. s4 1
Pursuant to section 697.01 of the FloridaStatutes, an instrument is said
to be a mortgage if, "when taken alone or in conjunction with surrounding
facts, it a pears to have been given for the purpose of securing payment of
money." 8 "Whenever property belonging to one person is held by another
as security for [a debt], the transaction is considered a mortgage. 843
The transaction in this case "was not a valid Illinois land trust; it was a
If there were default, Kirkland's
mortgage securing indebtedness.''
interest in the property reverted to Sportsmen's. 8 45 As such the transaction
was deemed "a mortgage subject to the rules of foreclosure."
Najera v. Nationsbank Trust Co. 84 7 Najera "apeal[ed] from a final
The appellate court
summary judgment of foreclosure by NationsBank."
on the record
reversed because it believed "issues of material fact" remained
"which should not [be] disposed of by summary judgment."8 49
Najera's deposition showed that he requested a copy of the property
appraisal but never obtained it. General Development Corporation said it
would take care of the appraisal because "'no bank would loan out more
money on a loan.., than the value of the property."' 85 0 Najera paid a fee for
the appraisal, with the understanding that it "was being done to verify the
property would provide the lending institution with sufficient collateral for
'
the loan."851
The appellate court believed "the allegations and [the] record creat[ed]
issues of fact concerning whether the Najeras relied upon the existence of a
professional appraisal to support the loan values, and whether they would
have entered into this transaction had those representations not been
made. 8 52 The record here established far more than the assertion of inflated
values.

841. Id.
842. Id. (quoting Hialeah, Inc. v. Dade County, 490 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing Cinque v. Buschlen, 442 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983))); see
FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1985).
843. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621.
844. Id.

845.
846.
847.
848.
849.
850.

Id.
Id. at 622.
707 So. 2d 1153 (Fla 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.at 1154.
Id.
Id. (quoting deposition).

851.

Id.

852.

Najera, 707 So. 2d at 1155.
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G[eneral] D[evelopment] C[orporation] and GDV [Financial
Corporation] collectively misrepresented the value of the lot the
Najeras already owned, the value of the condo for which they were
induced to swap the lot, the fact that they were to have
conventional financing (at least a 25% equity-to-loan ratio), that
the rental market in the area was sufficiently strong to cover their
mortgage payments, that the resale market for GDC properties was
strong at the false sales prices, and that there existed and would be
provided a professional appraisal to back up the value of the
property provided to them.
The appellate court recognized that "[i]f the alleged course of
fraudulent conduct on the part of GDC and GDV [were] established at trial,
and if it is shown was reasonably relied upon by the Najeras, these proofs
could provide them with a defense to this foreclosure action. 854
855
Southeast & Associates, Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass'n.
The
issue before the court was "whether the owners may set aside a foreclosure
sale [where constructive service was] based on affidavits of diligent search
and inquiry which were facially sufficient and complied with the statutory
requirements . 8 56
On July 1, 1995, an association assessment for semiannual maintenance
became due. Albert and Rose Love received a notice of delinquency from
the association. The notice stated that the association could file a lien
against the home and foreclose at a later date. 857 When the Loves failed to
pay the assessment, a lien was filed against the property. A partial payment
was made which the association returned with
that if full
....a notice stating
858
payment were not made, a foreclosure suit would be initiated.
When the association planned to foreclose, it hired a process server to
serve the Loves. The server failed to recognize that the Loves were at their
New York address and attempted numerous times to serve them at their Fox
Run address and at another Florida address said to be attributed to them. 859
Since personal service was not able to be made, the association served by
publication after filing an affidavit of diligent search and an affidavit of
constructive service.
Final summary judgment of foreclosure was filed

853.
854.
855.

Id.
Id.
704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

856.

Id. at 695.

857.
858.
859.
860.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Fox Run, 704 So. 2d at 695.
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against the Loves.
Southeast and Associates, the successful bidder at the
foreclosure sale, received a certificate of title. In return, the Loves made862a
motion "to set aside the sale based on an insufficient service of process."
"The trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent search
8 63 and inquiry
by Fox Run Association, and [set] aside the foreclosure sale."
Section 49.041 of the FloridaStatutes provides that:
a person may be served by publication upon verified statement
showing on its face that [a] "diligent search and inquiry have been
made to discover the name and residence" of the [individual] being
served. If the court finds that the verified statement is defective, or
the diligent search is deficient, the court must [decide] "whether the
864
trial court's judgment of foreclosure would be void or voidable."
If voidable, a foreclosure sale resulting from
constructive service cannot be
8 65
set aside as against a bona fide purchaser.
The plaintiff here followed the favored approach. It "filed a detailed
affidavit listing the [many] attempts [to deliver] personal service, the contact
with the neighbors, the two skip traces, and the trip to a retail establishment
where the process server learned that the lessee had moved out in the middle
of the night.8 66
Also, "'where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss as the
result of the default of another, the loss shall fall on the party who is best
able to avert the loss and is the least innocent.' '' 867 The Loves did not make
the requisite maintenance payment and could have told the Association of
their move to New York.
In addition, someone on the Loves' behalf kept
signing the certified letters and made partial payments. 869
United Companies Lending Corp. v. Abercrombie.870 The issue
presented was whether "the circuit court abused its discretion when it
declined to set aside a mortgage foreclosure sale of real property. 8 71 The
861.
862.

Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.

863.
864.

Id.
Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.

App. 1994)).
865.
866.
867.

Fox Run, 704 So. 2d at 696.
Id.
Id. at 697 (quoting Jones v. Lally, 511 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

1987)).
868.
869.
870.
871.

Id.
Id.
713 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 1018.
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appellate court held that the circuit court
872 was mistaken in its view of what its
scope of discretion is in such a matter.
United Companies Lending Corporation sued to foreclose its mortgage
on a residence owned by the appellee. "The circuit court entered a final
judgment... and scheduled a foreclosure sale to be held at the Sarasota
County Courthouse." 873 United's counsel agreed to attend the sale, but due
to an illness in the attorney's family, United sent another attorney to
appear. That attorney arrived early for the foreclosure sale at the wrong
courthouse, and only five minutes before the sale, the clerk informed him
that the sale was to be held in Sarasota. The clerk in Sarasota declined to
delay the bidding. By the time another attorney arrived, the property had
been sold to Darrell Crane for $1,000.874
United filed an objection to the sale and a motion to have the sale set
aside on the grounds that there was a "gross inadequacy of price and the
mistaken failure of its agent to attend.' 8 " Evidence at the hearing proved
that the property was worth over $125,000.00 and that United was going to
bid as high as $181,898.82. 876 Crane testified that he would have bid up to
$115,000.00.877
The circuit court found that the price paid for the property at the sale
878
However, it denied United's motion
was grossly disproportionate.
because the court found that the "inadequate price resulted from the
unilateral mistake of United's [counsel], and not from any mistake,
in0
misconduct or irregularity on the part of ...anyone else who participated 88
the sale."876 The circuit court cited Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin
8 for authority. 882 The appellate court decided
and Sulkowski v. Sulkowski 881
the circuit court mistakenly believed that this appellate court, unlike the third
and fourth districts, determined that the mistake cannot be a unilateral
mistake by the complaining party. 83 However, the law of this appellate
district does not differ from the other districts and follows the holding in Arlt
v. Buchanan.884 In Arlt, the general rule that came about was
872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.

Id.
Id.
Id
Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
561 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
Id. at 1018-19.
Id. (citing Arlt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1966)).
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that standing alone mere inadequacy of price is not a ground for
setting aside a judicial sale. But where the inadequacy is gross and
is shown to result from any mistake, accident, surprise, fraud,
misconduct, or irregularity upon the part of either the purchaser or
other person connected with the sale, with resulting injustice to. the
complaining party, equity will act to prevent the wrong result. 885This court did not construe "person connected with the sale" to mean that it
had to be a person who was physically present at the sale."' So, the circuit
court mistakenly read this court's past opinions to the contrary. 887
Whether the complaining party has made the showing necessary to set
aside a foreclosure sale is a discretionary decision that may be reversed only
when the court has grossly abused its discretion.
The court found that in
the present case, the circuit court's discretion was restricted by a mistaken
understanding of the law in this district and reversed and remanded for
reconsideration. 889 The court stated no opinion as to the balance of equities
in this case, but stated that, in one set of circumstances, "the fact that the
inadequate sale price was caused by the complaining party's own mistake
might tip the balance of equities in favor of the successful bidder; in another
case, it might not. ' 8 °
XVI. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL

Holloway v. Gutman.89 The evidence presented was that the parties
had a three-year lease with a purchase option. When that lease was about to
expire, they negotiated a renewal. The landlord tendered a copy of the
original with the term "whited-out." 892 They never did expressly agree to a
particular length. The tenant testified that he thought it would be for another
three years, but the landlord testified that the tenant had said that he simply
did not care; so they never reached an exact length. Because the option
lacked an essential term so it was not complete, there was no meeting of the
minds. There was no contract, oral or written.893
885.
886.
887.
888.
App. 1994).
889.
890.
891.

ArIt v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1966) (citations omitted).
Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1019.
Id. at 1018.
Id.; see RSR Investments, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 647 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
Abercrombie, 713 So. 2d at 1019-20.
Id. at 1019.
707 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

892.

Id. at 358.

893.

Id.
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894

Pomares v. J. Krantz Enterprises, Inc.
The purchase option for a
business included the building and land where it was located. The price was
to be the fair market value. If the parties could not agree on the value, then it
would be set by a licensed appraiser. If the parties could not agree on an
appraiser, then each was to select a licensed appraiser, and their appraisals
were to be averaged. The trial court found this option to be enforceable and
the seller appealed. 89' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 896 It
apparently had no difficulty with the price, but held that the option was
unenforceably vague
8 7 and indefinite because it failed to specify the terms or
time of payment.
XVII. RIPARIAN RIGHTS

Lee v. Williams.898 This court resolved the issue of whether the
appellant had a "right to construct a boatlift"899
by looking at which neighbor
"owns the nonnavigable tidelands of Florida."
[The two neighbors'] lots are contiguous. The westerly boundary
of the Williams' lot [Lot 13,] is defined as the centerline of
Butler's Branch, a small waterway shown on the plat of Butler's
Replat. [The] northern boundary of [the Lees' lot, Lot 12,] is
Julington Creek, a navigable body of water. The waters of Butler's
Branch and
Julington Creek join at the northwest end of the Lees'
9°
propertyIn 1960, the owner of Lot 13 excavated a navigable canal to run through
and across Lot 13, and through and across the conflux of Butler's Branch
and Julington Creek and into Julington Creek. 9° ' In 1961, when the
Williams purchased Lot 13, the canal had been excavated. In 1961, if the
boatlift had been erected "where it is today, it would have been o[ver] dry
land. ,,902 Over the years, the canal bank eroded toward the common
boundary line, and in the 1980's, the owner of Lot 12 constructed a bulkhead
along the then existing bank of the canal. Surveys show that a great portion
894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.

711 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id.
711 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
Id.
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In 1993, the Lees purchased Lot 12
of this bulkhead was built on Lot 13.
and, without the Williams' knowledge, sometime in 1994 constructed a boat
lift "in the canal adjoining the previously constructed bulkhead. The boat
lift is located entirely within Lot 13" and the Williams, upon, discovering
this, protested its construction. 9 m
The issue that this court looked at was "whether the canal, which
traverses nonnavigable tidelands within the Williams' lot, is privately owned
by [the Williams] or whether it is sovereignty land9 6available for public
9 7
0
use." 90 5 The trial court found that Clement v. Watson was dispositive.
In Clement, the court found that Watson was able to exclude Clement from
fishin& privileges in a cove surrounded by property owned by Watson's
wife. 9 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the basis of the decision in
Clement when it defined navigable waters and emphasized90 9that waters are
not navigable merely because they are affected by the tides.
The court distinguished between sovereignty and privately owned lands
as follows:
The shore of navigable waters which the sovereign holds .for public
uses is the land that borders on navigable waters and lies between
ordinary high and ordinary low water mark. This does not include
lands that do not immediately border on the navigable waters, and
that are covered by water not capable of navigation for useful
public purposes, such as mud flats, shallow inlets, and lowlands
covered more or less by water permanently or at intervals, where
the waters thereon are not in their ordinary state useful for public
navigation. Lands not covered by navigable waters and not
included in the shore space between ordinary high and low water
marks immediately bordering on navigable waters are the subjects
of private ownership, at least when the public rights of navigation,
etc., are not thereby unlawfully impaired. 910
The court concluded in Clement that the majority of states, including
Florida, base their determination on whether the water is navigable, and not
upon whether waters are tidal.9 1 The appellants, however, argued that
903.

Lee,711 So. 2d at 58.

904.
905.

Id.
Id.
58 So. 25 (Fla. 1912).
Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
Clement, 58 So. at 27.
Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58 (citing Clement v. Watson, 58 So. 25 (Fla 1912)).
Id.
at 59.
Clement,58 So. at 26 (emphasis omitted).

906.

907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
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reliance on Clement was an error and that the 1988 decision by the United
Sts..
M912
S e
States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. ississippi,
governed.
Therefore, the appellants concluded that all of Florida's tidelands are sovereignty lands of the state. 914 In Phillips Petroleum, the United
States Supreme Court held that "Iit]he states, upon entry into the Union,
received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide." 915 However, the Court also held that the states "have the authority
to define the limits of the lands held
916 in public trust and to recognize private
rights in such lands as they see fit.
This court looked to see how Florida law "defined the limits of lands
held in public trust and what private rights in tidelands" Florida
recognizes. 917 No Supreme Court of Florida case has overruled Clement, nor
has any case held that "a nonnavigable tideland [is a] sovereignty land. 918
Therefore, the appellate court919affirmed the trial court's decision that the land
is not to be sovereignty land.

XVm. SALES
Whitehurst v. Camp.92 An agreement for deed provided for "'interest
at the rate of 10 per centum (10%) per annum payable on the whole sum
remaining from time to time unpaid."' 921 The buyers defaulted and sellers
brought a successful foreclosure action, but sellers appealed, in part, because
the court applied a lower
postjudgment interest based on section 55.03(1) of
922
the FloridaStatutes. The statute established a statutory rate for judgments
but provided that it did not displace a rate of interest established by a written
contract. 923 At issue, therefore, was whether the language in this agreement
for deed applied the ten percent interest rate postjudgment as well as
prejudgment.
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the contract
912.

484 U.S. 469 (1988).

913.

Lee, 711 So. 2d at 59.

914.

Id.

915.
(1988)).
916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.

1996)).
922.
923.
924.

Id. at 60 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 481
Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988)).
Id.
Lee, 711 So. 2d at 62.
Id. at 64.
699 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 680 (quoting Whitehurst v. Camp, 677 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.

Id.; FLA.

STAT.

FLA. STAT.

§ 55.03(1) (1995).

§ 55.03(1) (1995).

Whitehurst, 699 So. 2d at 681.
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language did not apply postjudgment. 925 To do so would require explicit
language. Otherwise, the terms of the contract are extinguished by a
judgment in a manner similar to the contract merging into the deed in a real
estate sale. In both situations, the contractual term can survive only if the
intent of the parties is made clear.926
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. IT Rayonier, Inc.92 7 The seller of a 22,000
acre tract provided the buyers with a year old appraisal. Unfortunately, the
zoning shown on the tract was inaccurate. After unsuccessfully trying to get
the zoning changed, the buyers filed suit in federal court seeking
damages. 9m The jury found for the plaintiffs, but the trial judge granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 929 The case was appealed to the
eleventh circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court
of Florida:
WHETHER A PARTY TO A TRANSACTION WHO
TRANSMITS FALSE INFORMATION WHICH THAT PARTY
DID NOT KNOW WAS FALSE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
WHEN
THE
RECIPIENT OF THE INFORMATION RELIED ON THE
INFORMATION'S TRUTHFULNESS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT AN INVESTIGATION BY THE RECIPIENT WOULD
HAVE REVEALED THE FALSITY OF THE INFORMATION. 930

The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question with a qualified "yes,"
adopting the position of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
but subject to Florida's doctrine of comparative negligence. 931 A party who
negligently misinforms another may be held liable
932 if the other party
reasonably relies on that information to its detriment.
The eleventh circuit would then have to apply that answer in reviewing
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 933 The jury had been instructed
that the buyers had no affirmative duty to investigate the truthfulness of
statements made by the seller. 934 However, the buyers could have been
negligent in not investigating the facts on their own. That presented a
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.

Id. at 684.
Id.
696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 339.
GilchristTimber, 696 So. 2d at 337.
Id. at 336.
Id.
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question of fact, and reversal would be necessary so that the issue of
comparative negligence could be presented to the jury.935
The seller lost on its other points. Most importantly, handing over the
appraisal was a representation of the facts contained therein. The zoning
was represented incorrectly. 936 To establish that this constituted negligent
misrepresentation, it would only be necessary to show that the
misrepresented fact was material to the buyers.
However, that did not
require the buyers to have communicated to the sellers that such a fact would
affect their decision to purchase. 938 What was required was only that it
would have made a difference in their decision.939
Kehle v. Modansky.94 0 Kehle and Peralta signed a purchase contract
which required a $120,000 deposit. Kehle wrote out the check and delivered
it to the seller. Due to insufficient funds, the check was "dishonored.,,9'4 It
had not been made good by the time of the closing, so the closing never
occurred. Seller then brought this suit for breach of contract and for
statutory damages for tendering a worthless check. 942
The trial court
granted summary judgment for seller on both counts, $120,000 for liquidated
damages and $360,000 (treble damages) for the worthless check.
The
defendants appealed, primarily on their defense that they lacked knowledge
that the check was worthless, but the district court affirmed. 9 " Lack of
knowledge simply was not a defense. 945 The court also rejected the defenses
946
of "waiver" and "conditional delivery" to the statutory damages claim.
These had not been properly raised as affirmative defenses, but the court
noted that these would not have been defenses under the worthless check
statute anyway. 947
Nelson v. Wiggs.
Buyers saw a "For Sale By Owner" sign in rural
west Dade County. They bought the property because they wanted a place to
plant trees and raise animals. 949 They "requested no inspections of the
935.
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.

Id.
Id. at 339.
GilchristTimber, 696 So. 2d at 339.
Id.
Id.
696 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kehle, 696 So. 2d at 494.
Id.
Id.
699 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 259.
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property and did not [ask any questions of] the neighbors. 'g 0 What they
missed was that the land, except for the buildings which were built on high
ground, flooded every rainy season. While they could still live in the house,
it became an island on which animals also sought to escape the waters. It
was a very difficult situation. The trial court found that the buyers did not
ask about flooding and the seller did not volunteer the information. 951 The
critical question was whether the seller was under a duty to disclose the
seasonal flooding to the buyers under Johnson v. Davis. 952 The majority of
this panel answered the question in the negative.953
Under Johnson v. Davis, the seller is required to disclose "facts
materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer." 954 The buyers should have known that
Florida's rainy season might make low lying land near the Everglades
subject to flooding. Moreover, the buyer-husband was a contractor who had
visited the county building department to review permits and the like.955
Judge Sorondo dissented vigorously. 9 6 He characterized the buyers as
very "simple people" and noted there was nothing in the record to indicate
that there were visible signs of flooding of the nearby levee. 957 The
transaction took place during the "dry season." The usual inspections would
not have revealed that flooding was a problem. Nor was there any obligation
to question neighbors about unseen problems. Moreover, the seller had been
informed of the buyers' intended use of the land and she must have known
that the flooding would make that difficult. The conclusion
is that
"'elementary fair conduct' demanded full disclosure in this case." 958
Ni v. Deltona Corp.959 The buyer was purchasing three undeveloped
lots in a subdivision under three separate contracts. Each required the seller
to refund part of the money paid9-in the event buyer defaulted after having
paid fifteen percent of the principal. Buyer defaulted after having paid in
excess of fifteen percent of the principal. Having received no refund, buyer
sued. The seller defended that it was protected by the two-year statute of
950.

Id. at 260.

951.

Id.

952.

480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).

953.
954.

Nelson, 699 So. 2d at 260.
480 So. 2d at 629.
Nelson, 699 So. 2d at 261.

955.
956.

Id. at 261 (Sorondo, J., dissenting).

957.
958.

Id. at 263.
Id. at 265.

959.

701 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997):

960.

Id. at 889. The seller would have to refund the lesser of either a) the amount the

buyer had paid in excess of the 15%; or b) the amount the buyer paid in excess of the seller's
actual damages. Id.
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repose found in the federal Land Sales Act. 961 It argued that the statute of
repose was applicable because the refund provision was mandated by the
Act. The district court rejected that argument and reversed.962
The statute provided that a buyer could rescind a contract that did not
include a provision for refunding the payments when the buyer had paid
more than fifteen percent of the price. 963 The two-year statute of repose gave
buyer only two years from the date of contracting to rescind the contract.
However, the buyer in this case did not seek rescission; this buyer brought
an action for a refund based on the provision in
965the contract. The federal
statute of repose did not apply to such an action.
Ribak v. Centex Real Estate Corp.966 The residential development was
adjacent to a plant that treated both fresh water and wastewater. Twenty-two
residential home buyers alleged that they were told that it was a fresh water
treatment plant, but not that it treated wastewater. They sued for, inter alia,
fraud, conspiracy, negligent supervision, breach of duty to disclose,
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Florida Land Sales
Practices Act. 967 The trial court granted partial summary judgment because
the plant was not located on the land sold, and the buyers appealed. 968 The
district court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
e.g., the developer, who had not made the representations, but it reversed and
remanded as to the others. 969 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
that the critical question was whether the existence of a wastewater
treatment plant nearby was a material fact.970 If that fact would have
affected the decision to purchase the property, then it was material; and
materiality was a question of fact that would have to be decided by the
jury.9 7 1

A later decision from the fourth district seems to contradict Ribak in
973
972
buyers
v. Mobil
Corp.,rescission
In Billian
materiality.
regard
to the definition
alternative,
or, in the
unit ofsued
for damages
of a condominium

961.

15 U.S.C. § 1703(d)(3) (1994).

962.
963.
964.
965.
966.
967.
968.
969.
970.
971.
972.
973.

Ni, 701 So. 2d at 889.
15 U.S.C. § 1703(d)(3) (1994).
Id.
Ni, 701 So. 2d at 889.
702 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1316; see FLA. STAT. §§ 498.001-.063 (1997).
Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1317.
Ribak, 702 So. 2d at 1317-18.
Billian v. Mobil Corp., 710 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
710 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.1998).
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based on the developer's nondisclosure of construction defects. 974 The case
turned on whether the defects were material. The trial court refused to give
the standard jury instruction for a material fact in regard to a fraudulent
misrepresentation because it was, "one that is of such importance that [the
buyers] either would not have entered into the transaction or would not have
paid the same price for the unit." 975 The jury's verdict was for the
developer/seller; the buyers appealed, and the fourth district affirmed.976
The court noted that Johnson v. Davis, 977 the seminal case on the duty
to disclose, required disclosure of "facts materially affecting the value of the
property," not facts materially affecting the value of the property to the
buyers.
That eliminates the subjective value of the property to the
buyers. It makes the test an objective one. The court admitted that this was
a narrower test than the one traditionally used for fraudulent misrepresentation. 979 Hopefully the Supreme Court of Florida will clarify whether a
different standard is appropriate or merely the product of a missing phrase.
The district court also pointed out that the traditional subjective
standard should be applied in a rescission action that was not based on
Johnson v. Davis type nondisclosure.9 80 Consequently, the fact that the jury
found the defendants not liable for nondisclosure under Johnson v. Davis
would not necessarily preclude the court from granting rescission based on
facts that had been concealed. 981 The critical factor would be whether those
facts, if known to the buyers, would have led to their not making the
purchase.982
Stroud v. Crosby.983 The record contained evidence that the seller had
owned lots 690 and 691. When he sold 690, a portion of 691 was included.
Later, he listed 691 for sale. He advised the listing broker that he did not
own all of lot 691 and gave the broker a copy of the survey that correctly
showed what part of 691 he did own. The Multiple Listing Service ("MLS")
properly portrayed the dimensions of lot 691 as reduced by the earlier sale.
Buyers saw the property. They never requested or obtained any addi98 5
tional evidence, but proceeded to make an offer which the seller accepted.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.

Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 986.
480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
Billian, 710 So. 2d at 987.
Id. at 988-89.
Id. at 992.
Id.
Id.
712 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
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The contract described the property by its street address and as lot 691, but
did not include a legal description. Buyers then had a survey made by their
own surveyor, but that survey did not reveal that the seller only owned part
of lot 691.
At the closing, seller gave buyers a copy of his survey showing
the proper dimensions. Buyers then realized their mistake but went through
with the closing anyway. The deed had the proper legal description for only
part of lot 691.987
Some time after the closing, the buyers realized the magnitude of their
mistake. The lot was too small for the home they planned to build, so they
brought this action for rescission. The trial court entered a final judgment in
favor of the buyers on the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation, but the
district court reversed.98 8
Reversal is warranted where the appellate court does not find competent
substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact.989 The trial
judge failed to identify what fraudulent misrepresentations the seller had
made, and the district court judges could not find any evidence of fraudulent
misrepresentation in the record. 990 Buyers had incorrectly assumed they
were buyinf the entire lot; that alone was not a sufficient basis for
rescission.
Sunbank v. Retirement Facility at Palm-Aire, Ltd.9 92 Buyers sued for
damages and specific performance based on an alleged breach of contract.
The legal claims were tried to a jury, which delivered a verdict for the
buyers. 93 After the verdict, the buyers filed notices for a nonjury trial of
their specific performance claims, but the judge granted
the seller's motion
994
for a directed verdict denying specific performance.
The buyers appealed
and the district court reversed. 9
The seller's motion for the directed verdict was based on the buyers'
having failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support their claim for
996
specific
performance.
However,
that
ignored
thelegal
factclaims
that specific
performance
is equitable relief.
There is
a right
to have
decided
986. Id.
987. Id. at 435-36.
988. Stroud, 712 So. 2d at 435-36.
989. Id. at 436. See generally Clegg v. Chipola Aviation, 458 So. 2d 1186, 1187
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
990. Stroud, 712 So. 2d at 436.
991.
Id.
992. 698 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
993. Id. at 392.
994. Id. at 392-93.
995. Id. at 392. The damages award to the plaintiff-buyers was, however, affirmed.
Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 392.
996. Id.
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by a jury, and a claim for jury trial was made in this case. 997 Equitable
claims are decided by the judge. When claims of legal and equitable relief
are made in the same case, the legal claims are usually tried to the jury first
with the judge later hearing such additional evidence as might be needed to
resolve the equitable claims. In difficult cases, the judge might hold what
amounts to two separate trials or might require all evidence be presented
before the jury to expedite matters. In this case, however, there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the judge had ordered the buyers to present their
specific performance evidence at the same time as they presented damages
998
Thus, the buyers could have anticipated the opportunity to
evidence.
for a
present more evidence on that claim. To grant the seller's motion
999
directed verdict at that point was premature and reversible error.
XIX. SLANDER OF TITLE

Clearman v. Dalton.l°° This opinion resulted from a motion for
rehearing or clarification.' ° The Clearmans sought rehearing of the court's

unpublished order granting attorneys' fees to the Clearmans. This court
withdrew the previous opinion and the order awarding the Clearmans

appellate fees.'M2
The Clearmans recovered a judgment of $150,000 against the Daltons.

The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and stated there were two secured
mortgages against their homestead. The first mortgage in favor of the
Daltons' son was never recorded, and the second mortgage to Monticello
Bank was recorded but never delivered. ' The
°°3 Daltons never amended their
bankruptcy petition to correct the "error. 1
The trustee in bankruptcy elected to avoid the liens and obtained an
order from the bankruptcy court avoiding the morages and preserving the
The mortgages were
avoided obligations "for the benefit of the estate."
assigned to the Clearmans. After they recorded the assignments and the
judgments avoiding the mortgages, the Clearmans "attempted to foreclose on
997. Id. at 393.
998. To secure equitable relief, the buyers would have to prove that the remedy at law
was inadequate and that the equities balanced in their favor. Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 392.
These are not part of the damages action. Id.
999. Sunbank, 698 So. 2d at 393.
1000. 708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), replacing originalopinion, 22
Fla. L. Weekly D2022a.
1001. Id.
1002. Id. at 325.
1003. Id.
1004. Id.
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the interest acquired from thet]rustee."'' 10 5 Dalton counterclaimed "to quiet
title and for slander of title. ' 6 The trial court denied foreclosure but found
against the Clearmans on Dalton's counterclaim for slander of title and
awarded Dalton attorneys' fees. 00 7
The appellate court agreed with the trial court. 00 8 Although the
obligations evidenced by avoiding the mortgages were preserved for the
estate, section 544, chapter 11 of the United States Code "does not place the
[t]rustee (or the [t]rustee's assignees) in the place of the former mortgaees
with the power to foreclose and avoid... Dalton's homestead claim." 9
The bankruptcy estate had an assignable interest in the mortgages subject to
Dalton's claim of homestead.'0 10 The assignees paid a fair price for the
10 11 The Daltons could be required
assignment and could assert that interest.
10 12
homestead.
of
fact
the
to establish
"[F]iling of judgments [does not] constitute slander of title, even if the
assignment of the estate's interest was in the nature of a quit claim [sic]
deed."'0 13 The Daltons willingly filed their bankruptcy petition and
submitted their property to bankruptcy. 10 1 4 Therefore, they could not
subsequently "complain if the assignee of the estate's interest
requires that
0 15
they prove their entitlement to the homestead exemption."'
XX. SUBMERGED LANDS

City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement
Trust Fund.1016 The court reversed final summary judgment entered in favor
of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund that granted
fee simple ownership of submerged lands in the Board. 10 17 The Board was to
issue a disclaimer to the City for the land beneath the four piers. 1°Is

1005. Clearman, 708 So. 2d. at 325.
1006. Id.
1007. Id.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1011. Id.
1012. Id.
1013. Id.
1014. Id.
1015. Clearman,708 So. 2d at 325.
1016. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2028 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug, 27, 1997), opinion
withdrawn and supercededon reh'g by 714 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1017. Id.
1018. Id.
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The City claimed ownership of submerged land known as Palm Harbor
Marina in a suit to quiet title. The trial court stated that the City was entitled
only to a disclaimer as to the land immediately beneath the four piers it
The Butler Act was
constructed before the repeal of the Butler Act.
repealed in 1957 and was later replaced by section 253.12 of the Florida
Statutes that stated "[t]itle to all lands heretofore filled or developed is
herewith confirmed in the upland owners and the trustees shall on request
issue a disclaimer to each owner."10 20
The question was whether the improvements made by the City fell
within the parameters of the Butler Act. Specifically, the issues before the
court were:
[w]hether all the activities of the city in constructing a municipal
marina or boat basin including four substantial piers in 1947 and
1948, and the dredging of the boat basins in between and
so that
surrounding the piers resulted in a permanent improvement
21
title vested in accordance with the Butler Act.1
The court relied on the third district's opinions in Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Key West Conch Harbor,Inc. 022 and Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources.1023 In Key West, the court stated
the issue as not whether the dredging alone was a sufficient improvement to
convey title under the Butler Act, since moorings and a dock were
involved. 1 24 That court also looked to the other activities involved in the
construction of the marina. The court in this case reasoned that the Key West
case applied because the piers would be useless without the incidental
dredging for the piers to be utilized as part of the basin.' 025 As with Key
with dredging that was done for the sole
West, this case also does not1 deal
2
purpose of filling other land. 0 1
The court here adopted the third district's view that the issue of whether
a dredging constituted an improvement should be decided on a case by case

1019. Id. at D2029.
1020. Id. (citing Act of June 11, 1957, ch. 57-362, §1, 1957 Fla. Laws (codified as

amended at FLA.

STAT.

§ 253.12)).

1021. Boardof Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029.
1022. 683 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1023. Id.; see Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 466
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1024. Board of Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029; see Key West, 683 So. 2d at

145.
1025. Boardof Trustees, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D2029.
1026. Id.
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basis. 10 27 The piers would be useless as part of the marina without the
dredged area surrounding and in between.1° As such, the trial court erred
in determining that the title to submerged lands was vested in the Board. 1029
XXI. TAXATION
Kuro, Inc. v. Departmentof Revenue.' °3° Kuro, Inc. ("Kuro"), appealed
a final order which assessed an additional documentary stamp tax,
collectively, on conveyances of eight unencumbered condominium
units. 1 3 1 Stock issued by Kuro in exchange for the condominiums was
concluded in the final order to constitute consideration and, pursuant to the
applicable statutes and rules, this consideration was equal to the fair market
value of the condominiums. 1°32 The documentary stamp tax was based on
the fair market value.
This court reversed, finding that levying the additional
33
tax was error.

The condominiums were owned by a father and son team in 1991. In
1994, the father and son incorporated Kuro. Then, they transferred the titles
of the units to the corporation to avoid the potential liability for managing
the eight rental units. The father and son transferred each condominium unit
to Kuro by warranty deed. Each deed recited nominal consideration of ten
dollars and Kuro paid the minimum documentary stamp tax on each
transaction. °34 The Department of Revenue ("DOR") determined that
additional documentary stamp taxes were due. The administrative law judge
recommended the assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes, and
the DOR entered a final order adopting these recommendations.
The appellate court first looked at section 201.02(1), of the Florida
Statutes, which states "that a purchaser of real estate is required to pay a
documentary stamp tax of $0.70 on each $100 of consideration paid for the
property.' 1 36 It further states that when consideration is given in exchange
for real property or any interest therein is other than money, it is presumed
that the 0consideration
is equal to the fair market value of the real
37
property.1
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.
1036.
1037.

Id.
Id.
Id.
713 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 1021-22.
Id. at 1022.
Id.
Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1993)).
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1993).
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The court found that Kuro was not a purchaser within the meaning of
section 210.02(1).1038 Therefore, no additional taxes were due. Section
210.02(1) applies to transfers of real estate for consideration to a purchaser,
which has been defined by the Supreme Court of Florida as "one who
obtains or acquires property by paying an equivalent in money or other
exchange in value."'
The DOR's rule that deals with stock as
consideration merely creates a rebuttable presumption.'=
In this situation,
04 1
Kuro successfully rebutted the presumption.1
The appellate court found the conveyances were for the benefit of the
father and son, who were availing themselves of the advantages of
incorporation and that the father and son still were the beneficial owners
although not the legal owners.' 04 2 At the time the deeds were recorded, the
father and son owned all of the real estate and Kuro's stock. 104 3 The father
04 4
and son did not receive anything that they did not already have.1
Therefore, all that occurred were book transactions and not sales to a
purchaser.105 The court reversed the DOR's final order.'1
S & W Air Vac Systems, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. °47 The
appellate court affirmed the final administrative decision which held S & W
liable to the Department of Revenue for use taxes as the licensee of real
property, pursuant to section 212.031 of the FloridaStatutes.104 8
S & W owned coin-operated air vac machines used to vacuum cars and
add air to tires. Store owners having these machines received monthly
compensation in the form of a percentage of the units' gross receipts. S &
W had the responsibility to collect money from the machines, make repairs,
and pay licensing fees and taxes on them.1049 S & W described this
agreement as a "revenue sharing arrangement." 10 50 The hearing officer
found that payment was based on the right to place the machine in these
stores, and store owners should not be gaining compensation when the
1038. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1039. Id. (citing Florida Dep't of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla.

1976)).
1040. Id.
1041. Id.
1042. Id.
1043. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1023.

1044. Id.
1045. Id. (citing State ex rel. Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla.
1956)).

1046. Id.
1047. 697 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1048. Id. at 1314; see FLA. STAT. 212.031 (1995).
1049. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1314-15.

1050. Id. at 1315.
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machines are removed.' 05' The hearing officer concluded that S & W had
been granted licenses for the use of real property. Section 212.0310 of
52 the
FloridaStatutes dictated that use taxes were owed to the Department.'
First, the facts showed that the air-vac machines were not the subject of
a bailment. A "bailment" is a contractual relationship among parties in
is delivered temporarily to and
which the subject matter of the relationship
1053
owner.
the
than
other
one
by
accepted
Next, the arrangement with the store owners could not constitute joint
ventures. To establish a joint venture, five elements must be established in
addition to those required to form a basic contract. These elements
include: 1) a community of interest in the performance of the common
purpose; 2) joint control or right of control; 3) joint proprietary interest in
the subject matter; 4) a right to share in the profits; and 5) a duty to share in
4
Althouh
any losses which may be sustained.10
not. 05 theirst element was met,
were
others
the
that
the court recognized
S & W also questioned whether convenience stores and gas stations met
the use requirement of section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes.I ° 5 6 The
statute states, "[i]t is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is
exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting,
105
leasing, letting, or granting a license for the use of any real property"
The hearing officer and the Department of Revenue concluded the
transactions between S & W and store owners were taxable under section
212.031.105' That statute defines "business" as "any activity engaged in by
any person, or caused to be engaged
' 10 59in by him, with the object of private or
public gain, benefit, or advantage."
In this situation, "the licensors operated a commercial premises
designed to attract customers for revenue-generating purposes."' 60 The
ventures included income derived from a range of premises activity. So, it
was not a clearly erroneous interpretation to determine that store owners

1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Id.; see 5 FLA. JUR. 2D Bailments § 1 (1978).
1054. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1315; see Conklin Shows, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 684 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So.
2d 510,515 (Fla.1957).
1055. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1056. Id. at 1316; see FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1995).
1057. S & WAir Vac, 697 So. 2d at 1316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1995)).
1058. Id.
1059. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.02(2) (1989)).
1060. ld. at 1317.
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were in the business of granting a license under section 212.02 of the
FloridaStatutes.'° 1
Smith v. Welton. 1°62 The issue this court heard on appeal was whether
section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes is facially unconstitutional in
light of Article VII, Section (4)(c) of the Florida Constitution."3 Article
VII, Section (4)(c) provides:
Taxation; assessments.-By general law regulations shall
be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for
ad valorem taxation, provided:
(c) All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under
Section 6 of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just
value as of January 1, [1994]. This assessment shall change only as
provided herein.
1. Assessments subject to this provision shall be changed
annually on January 1st of each year; but those changes in
assessments shall not exceed the lower of the following:
(A) three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year.
(B) the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for all
urban consumers, U.S. City Average, all items 1967=100, or
successor reports for the preceding calendar year as initially
reported by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
2. No assessment shall exceed just value.
3. After any change of ownership, as provided by general
law, homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of
January 1 of the following year. Thereafter, the homestead shall be
assessed as provided therein.
4. New homestead property shall be assessed at just value
as of January 1st of the year following the establishment of the
homestead. That assessment shall only change as provided herein.
5. Changes, additions, reductions or improvements to
homestead property shall be assessed as provided for by general
1061. Id.

1062. 710 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1063. Id. at 136; see FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1995); see also FLA. CONST. art VII,
§ 4(c).

326
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law; provided, however, after the adjustment for any change,
addition, reduction or improvement, the property shall be assessed
as provided herein.
status, the
6. In the event of a termination of homestead
1 64
0
property shall be assessed as provided by general law.
However, section 193.155(8)(a) of the FloridaStatutes provides:
(8) Erroneous assessments of homestead property assessed
under this section may be corrected in the following manner:
(a) If errors are made in arriving at any annual assessment
under this section due to material mistake of fact concerning an
essential characteristic of the profperty, the assessment must be
recalculated for every such year.
The trial court found that section 193.155(8)(a) is unconstitutional
because the constitution states clearly that the assessment of just value shall
only change as provided by the statute, and section 193.155(8)(a)?permits
This
changes to the assessment that are not found in the constitution.
Statutes
Florida
of
the
193.155
court found that subsection (8)(a) of section
is facially unconstitutional, because the purported exception to the three
percent rule contained in section 193.155(8)(a) is not one provided for in the
constitution.'°67
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that provisions of the
constitution "cannot be altered, contracted or enlarged" by the
legislation. °r It determined the statute in question would defeat the purpose
of Article VII, Section (4)(c) by allowing constant reassessments of
homesteads when the purpose of section (4)(c) of Article VII is to encourage
the preservation of homestead property in the face of increasing real estate
development and rising property values and assessments. 10 69
The district court found no merit to Appellant's argument that without
section 193.155(8)(a), there would be inequitable taxation since the
constitution expressly mandates the special or inequitable taxation.' °70 Only
the homestead property receives the three percent cap, and, therefore, nonhomestead property, commercial, agricultural, and noncommercial
1064. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 136-37 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c)).
1065. Id. at 137 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1997)).

1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.
1070.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138 (citing Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 1982)).
Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
Id. at 137.
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recreational land are excluded from the three percent cap.1°71 Furthermore,
the constitution provides that assessments will not exceed just value, but
does not imply that assessments will be below just value. 12 Therefore,
this
0 73
court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment.
Legislative changes to chapter 98 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 98-185 to be retroactive to
January 1, 1998 and to be effective until it expires July 1, 1999.1074 This
chapter provides for a partial abatement of ad valorem taxation where
property has been destroyed or damaged by tornados.1 75 The application for
such abatement "must be filed by the owner with the property appraiser
before March 1, following the tax year in which the destruction or damage
occurred."' 0 76 Chapter 98-185 has the details and criteria to be included in
the application and what events will occur if the property appraiser
determines the applicant to be entitled to such partial abatement.'
Legislative changes to chapter 196 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 196.197 of the FloridaStatutes and its subparts were created to
qualify the continuing care facility established under chapter 651 of the
Florida Statutes, for exemption under section 196.1975 of the Florida
Statutes.
Continuing care facilities shall have a $25,000 homestead
exemption from the assessed valuation of the property for each apartment
occupied on January first of the year for which exemption from ad valorem
taxation is requested.') 79 These provisions shall take affect January 1, 1999,
and shall affect the 1999 tax rolls in each subsequent year's tax rolls. 080

XX.

TIMESHARES

Effective April 30, 1998, amendments to chapter 721 became
effective. Those changes include, but are not limited to, the following:

1071. Id.
1072. Id. at 137-38 (citing Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla.

1992)).
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.

Id. at 138.
Act of May 23, 1998, ch. 98-185, §2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1617, 1617.
Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1617.
Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1616.
Id., §1, 1998 Fla. Laws at 1616-17.
FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (1997).
Id. § 196.1975(9)(a) (1997).
Act of May 22, 1998, ch. 98-177, §3, 1998 Fla. Laws 1597, 1598 (codified as

amended at FLA. STAT.§ 196.197).
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To section 721.05 of the Florida Statutes, the legislature added a
definition of "regulated short term product."' 81 That term is defined to
mean a contractual right, offered by the seller, to use accommodations of a
timeshare plan, provided that the agreement is executed in Florida on the
same day the purchaser received an offer to acquire an interest in a timeshare
plan and does not execute a purchase contract, after attending a sales
presentation. The acquisition of the right to use includes an agreement that
all or a portion of the consideration the prospective purchaser paid for the
right to use will be applied to or credited against the price the purchaser will
or the future purchase price of a
pay in the future for a timeshare interest,
08 2
timeshare interest will be locked in.1
It is interesting to note that the legislature deleted section 721.075(4) of
the 1997 Florida Statutes when creating the 1998 supplement.1 83 That
paragraph required the developer to file an irrevocable letter of credit, surety
bond, or other assurance acceptable to the director of the division where the
aggregate represented value of all incidental benefits offered by a developer
to a purchaser exceeded five percent of the purchase
84 price paid by that
purchaser is no longer a part of the statutory scheme.
To section 721.09 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added sub
paragraph (c).' ° 5 This new provision provides for the seller's ability to
immediately cancel all outstanding reservation agreements, refunding all
escrow funds to perspective purchasers, and discontinuing accepting
reservation deposits or advertising availability of reservation agreements,
where the time share plan subject to the reservation agreement had not been
filed with the division as required by Florida law within ninety
8 days after the
date the division approved the reservation agreement filing.1 6
Subparagraph (d) was also added.1 87 This paragraph permits the seller
who has filed a reservation agreement and escrow agreement as required by
meets
statute to advertise the reservation agreement providing the 0material
88
the criteria prescribed by the subsections to subparagraph (d).1
To section 721.11 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added
subparagraph (6) and its subparts.1 89 These provisions provide that failing
to provide cancellation rights or disclosures required in connection with the
sale of a regulated short-term product automatically constitutes a
§ 721.05(27) (Supp. 1998).

1081.

FLA. STAT.

1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.

Id.
Id. § 721.075(4).
Id.
Id. § 721.09(c).

1086.

FLA. STAT.

§ 721.09(c) (Supp. 1998).

1087. Id. § 721.09(d).
1088. Id.
1089. Id. § 721.11(6).

19981
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Section
misrepresentation in accordance with section 721.11(4)(a).""
721.11(6)(a) requires the filing within ten days prior to use of a standard
form of any agreement relating to the sale of a regulated short term
product.1°9 1 Subparagraph (b) of that statute establishes the right of a
purchaser of a regulated short term product to cancel the agreement until
midnight of the tenth calendar day following the execution date of the
agreement. 0 92 It also provides that the right of cancellation may not
10 93be
waived by the prospective purchaser or anyone on its behalf.
Subparagraph (c) and its subparts with respect to this same statute provide
for statements that must be included in an agreement for purchase of a
regulated short term product. 10 94 Further, subparagraph (d) of the same
statute provides for a series of statements in conspicuous type that must be
included10 95
in an agreement for the purchase of a regulated short term
product.
Subparagraph (e) of the foregoing statute also provides for an
I09 Where
exemption from the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d).
the seller provides the purchaser with the right to cancel the purchase of a
regulated short term product for any time up to seven days before the
purchaser has reserved use of the accommodations, but certainly in no event
less than ten days, and if the seller refunds the total amount of all payments
made by the purchaser, although reduced by the proportion of any benefits
the purchaser has actually received prior to the effective date of the
cancellation, the specific value of which has been agreed to by the purchaser
and seller, the short term product
10 97 offer is exempt from the requirements of
the aforementioned paragraphs.
To section 721.15 of the Florida Statutes the legislature added
subparagraph (1)(b). 108 This section provides for allocating total common
expenses for a condominium or cooperative timeshare plan and allowing
such to vary on a reasonable basis if there is any interest in a common
element attributable to each time share parcel or time share cooperative
parcel ec9uals to share the total common expenses allocatable to that
parcel.'0 9

1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.

Id.§ 721.11(4)(a).
FLA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(a) (Supp.1998).
Id.§ 721.11(6)(b).
Id.
Id.§ 721.11(6)(c).
Id.§ 721.11(6)(d).
FLA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(e) (Supp.1998).

1097. Id.
1098. Id. § 721.15(1)(b).

1099. Id.
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To chapter 721 the legislature added Part IlI entitled "Foreclosure of
Liens on Timeshare Estates."1 1 Section 721.80 of the Florida Statutes
provides that Part I may be cited as the "Timeshare Lien Foreclosure
Act."" 0 ' This part consists of sections 721.80 through 721.86 and should be
read in detail to become familiar with the rights and procedures involved.'12
Furthermore, the legislature added Part IV to the chapter.1 °3 This
consists of establishing a Commissioner of Deeds to take acknowledgments,
proofs of execution, and oaths outside the United States in connection with
the execution of any instruments relating to or being used in connection with
a time share estate."0 4 This gart
consists of sections 721.96 through 721.98
5
and should be read in detail.'
XXIII. TITLE INSURANCE
Security Union Title Insurance Co. v. Citibank N.A. 11 6 The First
District Court of Appeal was asked to review a jury verdict finding the title
insurance underwriter vicariously liable for fraud committed by its agent, an
attorney, when he made fraudulent representation to the lender to obtain
loans, some of which benefited him personally and others of which benefited
his clients. Noting that the agent was expressly authorized only to issue title
insurance commitments and policies, and that the losses did not occur from
his acting in such a capacity, the appellate court found no vicarious liability
under that authority." 0
Next, it considered whether there might be vicarious liability arising
from the agent's acting within his apparent authority1 08 In doing so, the
appellate court noted that at least one element needed for this liability is that
there must have been some representation by the principal. 10 9 Here the facts
showed only that the principal made representations that the agent had the
authority to issue title commitments and policies. The fraudulent acts
involved the agent's representations made to obtain loans. There were no
representations by the underwriter that the agent had any authority to make
1100. Id. § 721.80.
1101. FLA. STAT. § 721.80-.86 (Supp. 1998).
1102. Id.
1103. Id. § 721.96.
1104. Id. §721.97.
1105. Id. §§ 721.96-.98.
1106. 715 So. 2d 973 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1107. Id. at 974.
1108. Id.
1109. Id. at 975. Presumably this representation must be one that would lead the
claimant to have relied reasonably on the appearance that the agent had the authority to
commit the act that caused the harm.
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statements as a closing agent to obtain loans. Also, it was clear that the
loans were for his personal benefit and his clients' benefit. Therefore, the
appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment
in favor of the underwriter. 110
XXIV. ZONING AND PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS

Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County..... The current
landowners, or their predecessors in title, acquired a large tract of land on
the shore of a lake. Most of it had been developed with apartment
complexes when the county, concerned about the impact of overdevelopment
on the lake, rezoned the area to single family housing. The landowners sued
in federal court. The United States district court dismissed the Takings
Clause claim on ripeness grounds, and they also refused to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the inverse 112
condemnation claim based on
Florida law; these rulings were not appealed.'
The focus of the appeal was the summary judgment against the
landowners on their due process and equal protection claims. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the due process
decision because there was "undisputed evidence of the County's interest in
protecting the water qlality at the lake," and the down zoning bore a rational
relation to that goal.
Similarly, denial of the equal protection claim was
affirmed because of "the undisputed evidence of the unique aspects of the
tract as contrasted to other assertedly similarly situated properties and the
lack of evidence of invidious discrimination."' 1 4 The court devoted most of
its energies to explaining why it affirmed the denial of the due process taking
claim."- s In brief, the court concluded that there was no such cause of
action under the United States Constitution.' 16 A concise review of United
States Supreme Court decisions involving regulatory takings clearly
established that the plaintiffs in this case, claiming a violation of federal
rights that had vested under an earlier zoning regulation, were limited to
actions based on violations of substantive
due process, procedural due
7
process, and the Takings Clause.'

1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.

Id.at 976.
121F.3d 610 (1lth Cir. 1997).
Id. at 611.
Id.at 614.
Id.at 615.
Id.at 612-14.
Villas, 121 F.3d at 615.
Id.
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Ammons v. Okeechobee County.111 8 Plaintiffs bought land on which to
live and start a construction business. A county zoning officer had advised
them that the land could be used for these purposes. 1 9 They applied for and
received an occupational license at that address and began the business.
Later, they applied for a building permit for the house which had space to
receive business deliveries. 1 20 Fifteen months later, the county realized that
the business was prohibited by the zoning. The county attorney sent
plaintiffs a letter informing them 21of the error and ordering them to stop
business activities at that location.
Plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin the county from revoking their
occupational license and for damages on a variety of theories. Summary 2
the plaintiffs, so they brought this apeal.1
judgment was granted. against
"123
...
The
The district court affirmed as to the estoppel and due process claims.
basis for the injunction claim was that the county should be equitably
estopped due to the representations of zoning officials. Landowners are on
constructive notice of zoning laws and the limited powers of zoning
officials. The zoning officials had no power to permit, either intentionally or
through error, a landowner to violate the zoning ordinance. Relief in equity
would be inappropriate because "[i]t would not serve public policy well to
permit such mistakes to persist when they affect public welfare, like
planning and zoning decisions do," nor could the plaintiffs recover damages
under section 1983, chapter 42 of the United States Code for a denial of due
process of law. 124 An occupational license, being merely a privilege and not
involving a fundamental right, may be constitutionally rescinded where
procedural due process is observed.'l 25 Plaintiffs here received a hearing on
the revocation.
City of Dania v. Florida Power & Light 1127 and City of Jacksonville
Beach v. Marisol Land Development, Inc. l1 28 In the City of Dania case,
Florida Power and Light ("FPL") filed an application for a special exception
so it could build an electrical substation in an area where that was not
1118. 710 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1119. Id. at 642.
1120. Id. at 642-43.
1121. Id. at 643.
1122. Id.
1123. Ammons, 710 So. 2d at 643. The summary judgment on the equal protection
count was reversed because the county had not filed any affidavits as to that claim. Id.
Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted. Id.
1124. Id. at 645.
1125. Id.
1126. Ammons, 710 So. 2d at 645.
1127. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D271 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1998).
1128. 706 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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otherwise allowed. Under the City Code, special exceptions "shall be
permitted" based upon compliance with seven requirements, two of which
were: the use would not cause substantial injury to other property in the
neighborhood; and the use would be compatible with adjoining development
and the intended purpose of the district. n 29 The Commission held a public
hearing. Testimony was presented by members of the public, a property
appraiser, and a certified land planner. Then, following the recommendation
of the City Planning and Zoning Board, the city commission denied the
exception.
The circuit court granted FPL's petition for certiorari, so the City
sought certiorari review in the district court of appeal. 11 31 The district court
reversed for two reasons.' 132 First, the circuit court had ruled that the City
had an especially heavy burden of proof to sustain a denial of the application
because the exception was being sought to provide for essential services, i.e.,
The district court could find nothing in the case law or
electric power.
the city code to support that ruling." 34 Imposing the wrong burden of proof
was a departure from the essential requirements of the law necessitating
Second, the fourth district concluded that the circuit court had
reversal.
departed from the essential requirements of the law by substituting its own
view of the evidence for that of the city commission.'13 6 When reviewing
local administrative action on a certiorari petition under rule 9.030(c)(3) of
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit court acts as an
appellate court.1 13 7 As such, it could not reweigh the evidence. 1138 Its role
regarding the weight of the evidence was only to determine if the fact finder
had substantial competent evidence on which to base its decision." 39 Here,
the record revealed the fact finder's opinion was supported by the
presentations of factual evidence by members of the public and testimony
The circuit court's order did not explain why this was
from two experts.'

1129.
6.40 (1998).
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.
1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.
1139.
1140.

Florida Power & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D272; see DANiA CrrY CODE §
FloridaPower & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D271.
Id.
Id. atD272-73.
Id. at D272.
Id.
FloridaPower & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D273.
Id.
Id. at D272; see FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3).
FloridaPower & Light, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D272.
Id.
Id.
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not substantial competent evidence and
141 the district court could not see any
reason to agree with that conclusion."
The trial court had made the same mistake in City of Jacksonville Beach
v. Marisol Land Development, Inc.1142 The rezoning petition had been
rejected by the city council after a full hearing. Twelve citizens had spoken
in opposition to the rezoning, and the city's planning staff's comments,
recommending against the rezoning, had been read into the record. The city
council concluded that rezoning would be inconsistent with its
comprehensive plan. The circuit court had disagreed and overturned the city
council's decision.1143 That was, the first district ruled, essentially de novo
review in which the circuit court substituted its own weighing of the
evidence for that of the city council.' 144 That is not the circuit court's role in
certiorari review of administrative action and in doing so, the circuit court
applied incorrect law requiring reversal.
City of Miami Beach v. Robbins" 46 and Bird-Kendall Homeowners
Ass'n v. County Board of County Commissioners. 147 These third district
cases involved opposite sides of spot zoning. Both reached the district court
via certiorari review of a circuit court decision. In City of Miami Beach, we
have reverse spot zoning. The City Commission upzoned the landowner's
land and the two adjacent blocks to RM-1 based upon an architectural study
and proposed amendments to the comprehensive plan. On review, the court
characterized the results as a "veritable island of RM-1 zoning" in "a vast
sea of RM-2 and other types of zoning."' 48 This was characterized as
"reverse spot zoning" because it subjects this property to restrictions from
which virtually all the neighbors are free. 49 It was invalid because it was
confiscatory.'
However, the court offered the observation that if
circumstances were to change, such as the proposed amendments to the
comprehensive plan being adopted and other areas also being rezoned, then
the decision might not prevent the City from successfully rezoning this land
to RMv-1.1151

1141. Id.
1142. 706 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1143. Id.
1144. Id. at 356.
1145. Id.
1146. 702 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1147. 695 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied by Garcia v. BirdKendall Homeowners Ass'n, 701 So. 2d 867 (Fla.1997).
1148. Robbins, 702 So. 2d at 1330.
1149. Id.
1150. Id.
1151. Id. at 1330-31.
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In Bird-Kendall, the county commissioners downzoned "a tiny, 0.23
acre tract," an area the size of a typical subdivision house lot, to allow the
landowner to operate a feed store when that was prohibited in the
surrounding area."1 52 This was characterized as spot zoning "to the nth
degree."'1 153- In fact, Chief Judge Schwartz wrote, "[t]he extent of the
violation of this principal is so pronounced in this case that the term 'spot
zoning' does not do it justice. Perhaps 'melanoma zoning' or, for short,
'melazoning' would be more appropriate." 1154
G.B.V. International,Ltd. v. Broward County.155 The developer sought
site plan approval for a mixed use development. Initially, the plan had been
rejected by the city because it had too many units per acre. 1 56 However, the
city's and county's comprehensive plans allowed for "flex units," a form of
transferred development rights under which the number of units can1 57be
transferred from other areas within the borders of that government.
S1158
However,
Utilizing flex units, the developer got approval by the city.
getting approval from the county was another matter. Although it was only
reviewing the plan for compatibility with the county's comprehensive plan,
the County Commissioners denied site plan approval, expressly disapproving
of the city's use of the flex units, even though the city was within its
authority in using them.1 159 The developer filed a petition for certiorari
review by the circuit court. It denied relief based on estoppel. 16 0 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal granted common law certiorari and quashed
the circuit court's order.
The standard for such review is whether there has been a miscarriage1162of
justice due to a violation of a clearly established principle of the law.
The district court found that it had occurred when the circuit court went
beyond the evidence that had been before the County Commissioners and
relied on a ground not considered by the Commissioners.' 163 Moreover, site
plan approval is a quasi-judicial function in which the Commissioners apply
Site plan approval should be granted to all who
policy rather than set it.
1152. Bird-Kendall,695 So. 2d at 909.
1153. Id.

1154. Id. at 909 n.1.
1155. 709 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

1156.
1157.
1158.
1159.
1160.

1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.

Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
G.B.V., 709 So. 2d at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156.
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meet the requirements of the law." 65 In this case, the developer had
submitted a plan that complied with the law, so site plan approval was a
ministerial function. 1166 Broward County was ordered to approve the site
plan."167
68
Poulos v. Martin County"
and Florida Rock Properties v.
Keyser.16 9 These two cases dealt with challenges to government action
under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes.l 7° In Poulos, a developer
obtained a development order from the Martin County Commission. The
redevelopment order was challenged under this section by a third person. As
required, the challengers filed a verified complaint with the county to give it
a chance to rectify the alleged inconsistency with the county's
comprehensive plan.' 17 1 Martin County Commission refused to set aside the
development order. Following the statutory procedure, the challengers then
filed the complaint in the circuit court, commencing this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief."1 72 The question was whether the circuit
court should then act as a reviewing court exercising certiorari jurisdiction or
grant a trial de novo. 1 173 The circuit court chose review as174under a certiorari
petition, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.'
Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes provided that the verified
complaint must be filed with the local government no later than thirty days
after it had taken an action inconsistent with the comVrehensive plan.
Then the local government had thirty days to respond. 11 6 If dissatisfied with
the response, the aggrieved person had to file the action in circuit court
within thirty days.
In sum, the action in circuit court could be filed as
much as ninety
days
after the complained
of action of the local
1178
1179
government.
However,
under
the
rules,
a
petition
fora certiorari,
the
means by which a unsuccessful applicant for approval of
development

1165.
1166.
1167.
1168.
1169.
1170.
1171.
1172.
1173.
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.

G.B.V., 709 So. 2d at 156.
Id.
Id.
700 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
709 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1995).
Poulos, 700 So. 2dat 163.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(c)(1).
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order obtains review,,must be filed within thirty days. 80° By the process of
deduction, section 163.3215 of the FloridaStatutes proceeding could not be
certiorari. Therefore, it must be a statutory procedure in the form of an
original de novo action. 1 81
The issue in Florida Rock was standing under this statute.1 8 2 At the
request of the landowner, the County rezoned Florida Rock's 509 acres from
agricultural to mining." 8 3 The challenger had a record as a lifelong activist
in environmental and wildlife matters, and he was the owner of land
approximately ten miles away." 84 He was also an environmental and land
use lav'yer practicing in the county.18 5 He claimed that the comprehensive
plan required that twenty-five percent be set aside to preserve native
vegetation. Florida Rock and the County disagreed, arguing that the setaside was inapplicable. " 6 The challenger filed a verified complaint seeking
declaratory relief under the statute.
The statute provided that "[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party
may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local
government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a
development order... that is not consistent with the comprehensive
plan.''n 87 It further defined "aggrieved or adversely affected party" as one
who "will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the
local government comprehensive plan.""' 8 8 The statute did not specify the
degree to which a protected interest must be affected, other than to provide
that "[t]he alleged adverse interest.., shall exceed in degree the general
interest in community good shared by all persons." ' 189 The court concluded
that the challenger here had not demonstrated a specific injury." 9° Being a
property owner in the county was not enough. Owning a business or even a
law practice in the county was not enough. In sum, the challenger here had
only proved that he was a citizen with an9 interest in the environment, and
that was not enough to establish standing." '
Judge Sharp provided a written dissent, pointing out that the statute did
not require a challenger to have a property interest injured by the
1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.

Id.
Poulos, 700 So. 2d at 165-66.
FloridaRock, 709 So. 2d at 176.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FloridaRock, 709 So. 2d at 176-77; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1995).
FloridaRock, 709 So. 2d at 177; see FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(2) (1995).
FloridaRock, 709 So. 2d at 177.
Id.
Id.
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governmental action, but that seemed to be the way the majority was reading
the statute." 92 The challenger had taken an active part in the process by
attending Planning Commission hearings, appealing the Planning
Commission's decision to the County Commission, arguing the appeal
before the Commission, and bringing this case." 93 He had moved to the
county because of the wildlife habitat that would be affected by the rezoning
decision and had a clear record of defending the environment."1 9 ' If he did
not have standing under the statute, then
1 95 standing under it was reduced to
those who could show monetary harm.'
XXV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey presents selected materials of significance to
those involved in real estate. There seems to be no consistent pattern to the
case law and legislative development, but there were also few surprises. The
law has continued to evolve in interesting ways, and we hope that this survey
proves useful in following that evolution.

1192.
1193.
1194.
1195.

Id. at 178-79 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
Id.
FloridaRock, 709 So. 2d at 178.
Id. at179.

